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NOTES 
The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer 
and Environmental Protection* 
[The Attorney General] is not a counsel giving advice to the 
government as his client, but a public officer, acting judicially, under 
all the solemn responsibilities of conscience and of lega.l obligation.t 
The increasing seriousness of consumer and environmental prob-
lems1 calls for action by the state governments.2 Any attempt on the 
part of a state to protect the public interest in these areas should 
be centered in the office of the state's attorney general. The attorney 
general's expertise in law enforcement and his position as the chief 
law enforcement officer of the state should allow him to combat 
consumer and environmental problems most effectively. 
In an effort to clarify the role of the attorney general as public 
representative, this Note will examine the functioning of the office 
of the Michigan attorney general.3 After an analysis of the nature 
• The author would like to thank the Michigan Attorney General, Frank J. Kelley, 
and his office for their help in the compilation of data for this Note. The assistance of 
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Ronald J. Styka; Assistant Attorneys General Edwin 
M. Bladen, Roderick S. Coy, Stewart H. Freeman, and Gay S. Hardy; and Complaint 
Examiner Fem Wright is especially appreciated. 
t C. CUSHING, A REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUGGESTING MODIFICATIONS IN 
nm MANNER OF CONDUCTING nm LEGAL BUSINESS OF nm Govm.'IIIIENT, H.R. Ex. Doc. 
No. 95 and S. Ex. Doc. No. 55, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1854). 
I. For discussions of the scope of consumer problems, sec D. CAPLOVITZ, TnE POOR 
PAY MORE (1963); W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF TIIE MARKETPLACE 
(1968); P. SCHRAG, COUNSEL FOR TilE DECEIVED: CASE STUDIES IN CONSUMER FRAUD (1972); 
Comment, RejJresentation of the Public Interest in Michigan Utility Rate Proceedings, 
70 M1etr. L. REv. 1367 (1972); Comment, Consumer Protection in Michigan: Current 
Methods and Some Proposals for Reform, 68 MICH. L. REv. 926 (1970). For discussions 
of the scope of environmental problems, see SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMENT: TIIE COMING 
CoLLtstoN (R. Campbell &: J. Wade ed. 1972); THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK (G, Debell 
ed. 1973); THE POLLUTION READER (A. DEVOS et al. ed. 1968); THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 
(H. Helfrich ed. 1970). 
2. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded that unfair con-
sumer practices and poor environmental conditions were significant contributory causes 
of the urban riots of the late 1960's. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION 
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 138-41 (1968). 
3. For discussion of roles played by attorneys general in other states, sec Baxley, 
The State's Attorney, 25 ALA. L. REv. 19 (1972); Burch, Maryland's "Action" Program 
in Consumer Protection, 42 STATE Govr. 161 (1969); Christenson, The State Attorney 
General, 1970 Wts. L. REv. 298; Mindell, The New York Bureau of Consumer 
Frauds and Protection-A Review of Its Consumer Protection Activities, 11 N.Y. L.F. 
603 (1965); Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the North 
Carolina Attorney General in the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA-
MURAL L. REv. I (1969); O'Connell, Consumer Protection in the State of Washington, 
39 STATE Govr. 230 (1966); Richardson, The Office of the Attorney General: Continuity 
and Change, 53 MASS. L.Q. 5 (1968); Saxbe, The Role of the Government in Consumer 
Protection: The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney 
General, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 897 (1968); Comment, The Role of California's Attorney 
[ 1030] 
Notes 1031 
and extent of the attorney general's powers and of his current util-
ization of those powers, several proposals to increase his effectiveness 
will be discussed. 
I. POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF' ATTORNEY GENERAL4 
In England the role of attorney general developed gradually 
from a position as the king's lawyer to that of the government's 
chief law enforcement officer. As chief law enforcement officer, the 
attorney general represented the government's interests in court 
and advised the different governmental departments on legal mat-
ters. 5 In addition, he had the duty and power to represent the inter-
ests of the public. 6 The offices of the colonial attorneys general were 
patterned after their English counterpart.7 The American Revolu-
tion brought few changes, as the new state attorneys general con-
tinued to act as the chief law enforcement officers of their respective 
General and District Attorneys in Protecting the Consumer, 4 U. CAL. DAVIS L. R.Ev. 35 
(1971); Comment, The Attorney General as Consumer Advocate: City of York v. 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1170 (1973). See also J. 
Sebert, Consumer Protection in the States and Local Communities, in STAFF STUDIES 
PREPARED FOR. THE NATIONAL lNSTlTUTE FOR. CONSUMER. JUSTICE ON 1. STATE AND FEDER.AL 
REGULATORY AGENCIES, 2. MISCELLANEOUS REDRESS MECHANISMS 1-113 (1973); Note, 
Consumer Protection by the State Attorneys General: A Time for Renewal, 49 NoTR.E 
DAME LAw. 410 (1973); Tannenbaum, In Many States, Office of Attorney General Grows 
More Powerful, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 1 (eastern ed.). 
4. See generally Bellot, The Origin of the Attorney-General, 25 LAW Q. REv. 400 
(1909); Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney General in 
England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304 (1958); Holdsworth, The 
Early History of the Attorney General and Solicitor General, 13 ILL. L. R.Ev. 602 (1919). 
During the Middle Ages in England, the king was represented by many different 
serjeants and counselors, each of whom represented the Crown only with respect to 
certain matters, only in certain courts, or only in specific geographic areas. 6 W. HoLDs-
woRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-60 (2d ed. 1937); Cooley, supra, at 306. The office 
of the attorney general came into formal existence in 1472 when William Husee was 
appointed attorney general with the power to appoint deputies to act for him in courts 
of record throughout the realm. Bellot, supra, at 410. The office evolved slowly, acquir-
ing a wide variety of powers as it grew. By the sixteenth century, th'e attorney general 
had assumed the role of the chief representative of the state in the courts. 6 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra, at 461. 
5. 6 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 457-58, 460-61. 
6. l HALSBUR.Y, THE LAws OF ENGLAND 9, 11 6 (1907) ("Where the right infringed is 
a public right, and where the grievance is a grievance to the whole community equally, 
••• the appropriate remedy is by proceedings of a public nature, i.e., indictment or an 
action by the Attorney-General, as the guardian of the public's rights.'); 2 RULING CAsE 
LAW, Attorney General § 4, at 915-16 (1914) ("[IJt is generally held that, in exercise of 
his common law powers, an attorney-general may ••• intervene in all suits or proceed-
ings which are of concern to the general public.'). See also Howard v. Cook, 59 Idaho 
391, 397, 83 P .2d 208, 211 (1938); Capitol Stages, Inc. v. State ex rel. Hewitt, l!i7 Miss. 
576, 591, 128 s. 759, 763 (1930). 
'l. See generally 0. HAMMONDS, THE ATIOR.NEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 
(Anglo-American Legal History Series, ser. I, no. 2, 1939); Cooley, supra note 4, at 
309-12. Despite the differences among the types of colonial governments, the powers and 
£unctions of the colonial attorneys general were very similar throughout the colonies. 
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states with the same common law powers and duties that they had 
possessed before the Revolution.8 
The office of the attorney general in the territory of Michigan 
was created in 1807.9 The powers and duties given to the attorney 
general were to prosecute and defend all suits, both civil and crim-
inal, for and against the United States or the territory, and to per-
form all official duties required by the legislature, the governor, 
and the courts. Under the territorial government, the common law 
prevailed except as changed by statute,10 and the attorney general 
presumably retained his common law powers.11 When Michigan 
became a state in 1837, its new constitution continued the office12 
and provided that its powers and duties were to be "prescribed by 
law."13 Subsequent enabling legislation passed in 1838 expanded 
the powers and duties of the office beyond those it had possessed 
under the earlier territorial statutes.14 By 1919, the attorney general 
8. Cooley, supra note 4, at 311-12. In most of the new states, the constitutions pro• 
vided for the office of the attorney general. The attorney general was to be appointed 
by the governor, the legislature, or both. See, e.g., DEL, CONST. art. 3, § 8, art. 8, §§ 1, 5 
(1792); N.J. CoNST, art. XII (1776), 
9. Act of Jan. 29, 1807, No. 12, 4 Mich. Terr. Laws 15 (Supp, 1884). 
IO. May v. Rumney, 1 Mich. I, 3-4 (1847); In re Sanderson, 289 Mich. 165, 174-75, 
286 N.W. 198, 201-02 (1939). 
II. The Michigan courts have held that the common law remains in full force 
except as specifically restricted by constitution or statute. Bugbee v. Fowle, 277 Mich, 
485, 492, 269 N.W. 570, 572 (1936); Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, 188-89 (Mich. 1845), 
They have also stated specifically that the attorney general retains his common law 
powers. Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 450-51, 185 N.W. 877, 880 (1921); People 
v. Karalla, 35 Mich. App. 541, 544, 192 N.W.2d 676, 678, motion for leave to 
appeal denied, 386 Mich. 765 (1971); [1941-1942] MICH, AITY. GEN. BIENNIAL 
REP. 309, 310. See also People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396, 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) 
("As the powers of the attorney-general, were not conferred by statute, a grant 
by statute of the same or other powers, would not operate to deprive him of those 
belonging to the office at common law, unless the statute, either expressly, or by reason• 
able intendment, forbade the exercise of powers not thus expressly conferred."). See 
generally NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATIORNEYS GENERAL, COMllllITEE ON TIIE OFFICE OF 
ATIORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON nm OFFICE OF AnoRNEY GENERAL 32-61 (1971~ [herein• 
after OFFICE OF AnoRNEY GENERAL]; Shepperd, Common Law Powers and Duties of the 
Attorney General, 7 BAYLOR L. REv. I (1955); Note, Attorney General-Common Law 
Powers Over Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Litigation of the State, 16 N.C. L. REv. 
282 (1938). 
12. MICH. CoNST. art. 7, § 3 (1835). The new attorney general was to be appointed by 
the governor with the consent of the state senate for a tenn of two years. MICH. CONST, 
art. 7, § 3 (1835). 
13. MICH. CoNST. art. 7, § 3 (1835). In 1836, the legislature declared that the attorney 
general was to have the same powers and duties that he had had under the territorial 
government. Act of March 28, 1836, § I, [1835-1836] Mich. Laws 43. 
14. The powers and duties vested in the attorney general by that act included the 
power to appear for the state before the Michigan supreme court, or any other court, 
when requested to do so by the governor or the legislature in a case where the state was 
a party or otherwise interested, MICH, REv. STAT, pt. first, tit. III, ch. I, § 20 (1838); the 
duty to consult with and advise the local prosecuting attorneys, 1\IIcn. REV, STAT, pt. 
first, tit. III, ch. I, § 21 (1838); the duty to submit an annual report to the legislature, 
M1cH. REv. STAT, pt. first, tit. III, ch. I, § 21 (1838); the power to issue advisory 
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was empowered to intervene in any judicial action in order to pro-
tect the rights or interests of the state or the people of the state.16 
Since the attorney general's role in any governmental system is 
dependent upon the powers and authority vested in his office, a 
detailed review of his powers must precede any discussion of how 
he can better protect the public in consumer and environmental 
areas. 
A. General Powers of the Michigan Attorney General 
As the state's chief law enforcement officer, the Michigan attor-
ney general has substantial general powers to deal with all consumer 
and environmental problems. These include the powers to repre-
sent all state boards and agencies, to initiate cases to protect the 
public interest, and to intervene in litigation where it is necessary 
to protect the public interest. 
The first major way in which the attorney general can protect 
the public interest is through his power to represent all state boards 
and agencies.16 This power is vested exclusively in the office of the 
attorney general, and no state agency or official may hire outside 
counsel to represent its or his interests.17 So long as the state boards 
and agencies are representing the public interest, the effect of the 
attorney general's representation of them is to further the public 
interest. 
The attorney general, however, has been forced to recognize two 
limitations on this power. First, the lack of adequate resources-in 
particular, the lack of funds needed to employ additional assistant 
attorneys general and investigators-has occasionally led the attorney 
general to allow state agencies to hire outside counsel. The attorney 
general considers this practice illegal18 and rarely perm~ts it. At the 
opinions whenever requested to do so by a house of the legislature or any state office, 
1M1cH. REv. STAT. pt. first, tit. III, ch. I, § 23 (1838); and the duty to recommend 
changes in the criminal jurisprudence system of the state to the legislature. MICH. REv. 
STAT, pt. first, tit. III, ch. I, § 22 (1838). 
15. Act of May 12, 1919, No. 232, § I, [1919] Mich. Pub. Acts 418. 
rn: MICH. CoMP, LAws ANN. § 14.29 (1967). While the statute speaks only of repre-
sentation for the elected state officials, it has always been assumed that it includes all 
state agencies. See note 17 infra. , 
17, See Act of Aug. 26, 1973, No. 130, § 23, [1973] Mich. Pub. & Loe. Acts-: "All 
legal services, including representation before courts and administrative agencies 
rendering legal opinions and providing legal advice to any state department or agency, 
shall be performed by the attorney general and no state agency shall employ or enter 
into a contract with any other person for such services." The Michigan courts and the 
attorney general bad earlier reached the same result. See Jennings v. State Veterinary 
Bd., 156 Mich. 417, 120 N.W. 785 (1909); [1926-1928] MICH. A'ITY. GEN. BIENNIAL 
REP. 281. 
18. See [1926-1928] MICH. ATIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 281, 282-83 (1927): 
We have had in this state at different times, specific statutes which authorized 
departments created for special purposes, to employ an attorney; but these statutes 
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present time no outside counsel are employed by any state agency, 
with the exception of the Civil Service Commission.19 
A second, and more serious, limitation arises from conflict-of• 
interests problems. For example, since the assistant attorneys gen-
eral are civil service employees,20 the attorney general, despite his 
opinion that outside counsel are hired illegally, allows the Civil 
Service Commission to hire outside attorneys to represent it, in order 
to avoid the appearance of conflict.21 Another kind of conflict of 
interests occurs when the attorney general's office is called upon to 
represent nvo state agencies on opposite sides of a controversy. This 
problem is easily handled if each agency is represented by a sepa-
rate division of the office, for the nvo divisions can simply work 
independently in presenting each agency's case. If the two agencies 
are normally represented by the same division, two solutions are 
possible. First, the attorney general may assign each agency's case 
to a different assistant attorney general within the division, with 
instructions that they work independently. This, however, does little 
to remove the appearance of a conflict. Alternatively, the attorney 
general may assign the representation of one of the agencies to the 
Special Litigation Division, while the other agency is represented 
by the regular division for that agency.22 
A conflict-of-interests problem may also arise when the attorney 
general perceives that the public interest is on one side of a con-
troversy and a state agency is on the other. This situation can be 
handled in several ways. One solution, again, is to have the Special 
have been regarded by this department as unconstitutional, and the authority has 
been permitted and to be exercised [sic) by such attorneys for such departments, 
only because this department has not had an appropriation sufficient to enable it to 
employ the necessary assistants to take charge of all the work. 
The attorney general opposes the hiring of such outside counsel because it limits ltls 
power to influence and affect administrative policy within the state. 
19. Interview with Ronald J. Styka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Michigan 
Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, August 27, 1973 [hereinafter Styka 
Interview]. 
20. DeMaggio v. Attorney General, 300 Mich. 251, 261, 1 N.W.2d 530, 533 (1942), 
21. Styka Interview, supra note 19. The attorney general's office is currently seeking 
to terminate this practice. Telephone interview with Ronald J. Styka, Assistant Deputy 
Attorney General, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, May 17, 1974. 
22. Interview with Roderick S. Coy, Assistant Attorney General, Special Litigation 
Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, August 27, 1973 
[hereinafter Coy Interview]. Use of the Special Litigation Division is limited since the 
division has only two assistant attorneys general assigned to it and has many other 
responsibilities. See text accompanying notes 180-86 infra. One recent example of a 
conflict of interests was Water Resources Commn. v. Chippewa County, No. 12!i5 
(Chippewa County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Aug. 31, 1973), where the defendant joined the 
State Highway Department as a third-party defendant. This meant that the attorney 
general's office was counsel for both the plaintiff, as the legal representative of tlte 
Water Resources Commission, and the defendant, as the representative for the Highway 
Department. Conflict-of.interests problems were avoided by having a separate division 
within the office represent each state agency. 
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Litigation Division represent the public interest by instituting an 
action against the agency or intervening on the side of a private 
party in litigation against the agency.23 AB a second alternative, the 
attorney general may attempt to persuade the agency to alter its 
position. If the agency will not change its stance, the attorney gen-
eral may refuse to represent it with respect to that issue.24 Finally, 
the attorney general may, if he feels that conflict cannot be properly 
handled by the procedures discussed above, permit the agency to 
secure outside counsel at its own expense; as suggested above, this 
procedure is very rarely used.25 
A second major source of the attorney general's power to pro-
tect the public interest is his statutory power to act, whenever nec-
essary, to protect the rights and interests of the people of the state.26 
The common law similarly empowers him to act whenever necessary 
to protect the public interest.27 Both the statutory and common 
law powers, however, are limited in that they do not allow the attor-
ney general to recover damages on behalf of individual state citizens. 
Recently, attempts have been made to overcome this limitation 
by use of the common law doctrine of parens patriae, under which 
the attorney general retains the power to act for the protection of 
lunatics, infants, and others who are unable to protect themselves.28 
In the past courts have allowed attorneys general to use this doctrine 
to secure injunctive or declaratory relief,29 but they have not been 
willing to extend the power to allow the attorney general to recover 
damages on behalf of individual citizens.30 It could be argued, how-
ever, that the doctrine should be expanded to include cases of cor-
porate consumer fraud and pollution because the public, or at least 
23. See note 22 supra for limitations on the use of the Special Litigation Division. 
But see Arizona State Land Dept. v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960), where 
the court, in a state that does not recognize the common law powers of the attorney 
general, refused to allow the attorney general to bring an action on behalf of the public 
to enjoin the proposed sale of public lands by a state agency. See Casenote, 2 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 293 (1960), 
24. Styka Interview, supra note 19. See text accompanying notes 289-94 infra. 
25. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
26, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, §§ 14.28, .101 (1967). 
27. See note 6 supra. 
28. See 3 w. BLACKSTONE, COMIIIBNTARIES •47, •426-27. 
29. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 5!'>3 (1923); Missouri v. Illinois, 
180 U.S. 208 (1901). The attorney general can act to protect such interests as the environ-
ment and the general economy of the state under the doctrine. Hawaii v. Standard Oil 
Co,, 405 U.S. 251, 258-60 (1972). The state may "sue as parens patriae to prevent or 
repair harm to its 'quasi-sovereign' interests." 405 U.S. at 258. 
30, "[T]he state's parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt to recover 
damages on behalf of the state's individual citizen-claimants." Hawaii v. Standard Oil 
Co., 405 U.S. 251,258 (1972). The Court seemed to be particularly concerned that allow-
ance of the action might lead to double recoveries and to a substitute for class-action 
procedures. See 405 U.S. at 263-64, 266. 
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large portions of it, is incapable of protecting itself when faced with 
those problems. 
While the Michigan courts have been silent on this question, 
a recent federal court decision has probably reduced the likelihood 
of such an expansion. In California v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,31 the state 
of California, as parens patriae, brought an action to recover treble 
damages on behalf of its citizens for injuries alleged to have been 
suffered as a result of a conspiracy to fix and maintain prices in 
violation of the Sherman Act.32 The court recognized that the royal 
prerogative function of parens patriae had passed to the states but 
could find no judicial recognition for using the doctrine "as a basis 
for recovery of money damages for injuries suffered by individuals.''33 
The court also rejected the state's contention that "the practical 
inability of an injured citizen to bring an individual suit in his 
own "behalf creates a ... disability [ comparable to that suffered by 
lunatics and infants] and warrants the establishment of a state pre• 
rogative to act for his protection."34 The court stated that, "if the 
state is to be empowered to act in the fashion here sought . . . that 
authority must come not through judicial improvisation but hy 
legislation and rule making."35 Nonetheless, this possibility remains 
open to a court that is willing to use its traditional power to define 
and control the common law. 
31. 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). See also In re 
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf. Hawaii, v, 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1•7 (1970). For a discussion of the value of using parens patriae in 
these areas, see Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the 
Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 193 (1970); Note, State Protection of Its Economy 
and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRon. 411 
(1970). 
33. 474 F.2d at 775. .,_ 
34. 474 F.2d at 776. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 265 (1972): 
"We note in passing the State's claim that the costs and other burdens of protracted 
litigation render private citizens impotent to bring treble-damages actions, and thus 
that denying Hawaii the right to sue for injury to her quasi-sovereign interests will 
allow antitrust violations to go virtually unremedied. Private citizens are not as power-
less, however, as the State suggests." The Court then noted the private citizens' right of 
action to secure injunctive relief and damages for antitrust violations without regard to 
the amount in controversy, the private class action, and the fact that the costs of litiga-
tion and attorneys' fees could be recovered in an antitrust suit for damages as proof 
that the public is not impotent. The Supreme Court did not, however, mention several 
other factors that might support a contrary finding. These include the recent limita• 
tions placed on the federal class action by the Supreme Court and other federal courts, 
see, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S., Dec. 17, 1973); the 
small amount of each individual's damages, which would lead to no one citizen having 
enough incentive to initiate prolonged litigation; the high costs of such litigation, 
which, even though recoverable, will preclude action by the average citizen, who can 
not afford to invest in a speculative venture of this type; and the higher deterent effect 
that would exist if the claims of citizens were collected and prosecuted by the state, 
See generally Malina & Blechman, supra note 32, at 213-17. 
35. 474 F.2d at 777. 
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A third major power that the attorney general can use to pro-
tect the public interest is the power to intervene in any proceeding 
in which the public interest is threatened.36 Specifically, the attorney 
general is "authorized and empowered to intervene in any action ... 
in any court of the state whenever such intervention is necessary 
in order to protect any right or interest of the state, or of the people 
of the state.''37 This reaffirms his common law power to intervene in 
an action in order to protect the public interest.38 The Michigan 
courts have broadly construed the power so as to give the attorney 
general a large measure of control over a case once he has inter-
vened. 89 
They have concluded that the statute granting the power to 
intervene also allows the attorney general to initiate an action to 
protect the public interest, a power more useful than intervention 
in an affirmative program of consumer and environmental protec-
tion. In In re Lewis' Estate,40 where the Attorney General petitioned 
the probate court for reimbursement to the state from the estate 
of a deceased mental patient for the costs of that patient's hospital-
ization in a state institution, the ~ourt held that "[w]hile a distinc-
tion may be drawn between intervening in a proceeding and insti-
tuting a suit there is a merger of purpose, by reason of public policy, 
when the interests of the State call for action by its chief law officer 
and there is no express legislative restriction to the contrary.''41 
These three broad powers-to represent all state agencies and 
to initiate or intervene in any judicial action where the public inter-
est is involved-if properly used, give the attorney general the neces-
sary standing to take action in any controversy involving consumer 
and environmental problems. 
B. Consumer Protection Powers of the Attorney General 
The attorney general is vested with a wide range of consumer 
protection powers. He has the authority to initiate criminal prose-
cutions for false advertising,42 for the obtaining of money under 
36. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 14.101 (1967). A simlar power is granted to the 
attorney general in MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 14.28 (1967). The Michigan courts have 
held that this power is to be construed liberally. People v. O'Hara, 278 Mich. 281, 294, 
270 N.W. 298, 303 (1936). 
37. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 14.101 (1967). 
38. See text accompanying note 27 supra. 
39. E.g., Russell v. Peoples Wayne County Bank; 275 Mich. 415, 266 N.W. 401 (1936), 
where the court granted the attorney general's motion to dismiss after the attorney 
general had intervened in a bank liquidation proceeding. 
40. 287 Mich. 179, 283 N.W. 21 (1938). 
41. 287 Mich. at 184, 283 N.W. at 23. See People v. Karalla, 35 Mich. App. 541, 
543-44, 192 N.W.2d 676, 677-78, motion for leave to appeal denied, 386 Mich. 765 (1971). 
42. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN. § 750.33 (1968). While the statute does not specifically 
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false pretenses,43 and for the violation of any of fifty-four state stat-
utes regulating the sale and marketing of various products and 
services.44 
The attorney generid has an even broader range of powers under 
which he can bring civil actions to protect the consumer. For 
example, he can initiate actions for the violation of several regula-
tory statutes in the area of retail sales. Under the Home Improve-
ment Finance Act45 he can bring an action to restrain or prevent 
any violation of the provisions of the Act that regulate the terms 
of home-improvement contracts.46 However, the Act only requires 
the full disclosure of the terms of the contract and does not attempt 
to regulate its substantive content,47 Most of the retail-sales statutes 
are similarly designed to provide full disclosure and do not control 
the substance of the contracts.48 While full-disclosure provisions 
refer to the attorney general, his power of intervention would allow him to initiate 
actions under this statute. See te.'Ct accompanying notes 40-41 supra. 
43. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 650.218 (1968). While the statute does not specifically 
refer to tbe attorney general, his power of intervention would allow him to initiate 
actions under this statute. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. 
44. For as complete a compilation of these statutes as is presently available, sec 
Michigan Consumers Council, Summary of Consumer Protection Legislation (May 1060). 
Each of these statutes prohibits fraud or deception in the sale or marketing of n product 
or service, For example, under the Comminuted Meat Law, MICH, Cor,w. LAws ANN, 
§§ 289,581-.592 (1967), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 289.581, .582, .583a 
(Supp. 1973), "[a]ny person or persons, firm or corporation, who shall publicly advertise 
in or by newspapers, window banners, hand bills, bulletins, bulletin boards, ,:adio, tele• 
vision or otherwise, falsely with reference to tbe composition of products within the 
scope of this act manufactured, sold or offered for sale by him shall be deemed guilty of 
a misdemeanor." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 289.589 (1967). While these statutes do not 
specifically refer to the attorney general, his power of intervention would allow him to 
initiate actions under these statutes. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra, 
45. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.1101-.1431 (1967), as amended, MICH, CoMP. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 445.llll, .1207, ,1208 (Supp. 1973). Other statutes involving the regulation of 
retail sales include: Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN, 
§§ 492.101-.138 (1967), as amended, MICH, COMP, w.ws ANN, §§ 492,102, .106, .109, .113, 
.122a, .136 (Supp. 1973); Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Contracts Act, MICH. COMP, 
LAWS ANN. §§ 566.301-.302 (1967); Retail Installment Sales Act, MICH, COMP, LAws 
ANN. §§ 445.851-.872 (1967), as amended, MICH, COMP, LAWS ANN, §§ 445,851a, .852, .865 
(Supp. 1973); Home Solicitation Sales Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.111-.117 
(Supp. 1973). 
46. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 445.1422(1) (1967). 
47. The Michigan statutes do attempt to provide some substantive protection for the 
consumer by prohibiting the inclusion of certain clauses in retail-sales contracts. For 
example, waiver-of-defenses clauses are prohibited in retail-installment-sales contracts, 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.864(£) (1967), and in tbe financing of motor vehicle sales, 
MICH, COMP. LAws ANN, § 492.114(£) (1967). The rights of a holder in due course arc 
limited by the Home Improvement Finance Act. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1207(1) 
(1967). But see MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 492.114(£) (1967), which explicitly states that 
the prohibited-clauses provisions of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act "shall in no 
way impair or affect the rights and powers of a holder in due course of a negotiable 
instrument." See also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, §§ 445.861, 445.1206, 492,114 (1967), See 
generally Comment, 68 MmH. L. REv. 926, supra note I, at 936-46. 
48. See statutes cited in note 45 supra. 
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provide the consumer with the opportunity to compare credit terms 
and to choose the contract with the most favorable terms, their 
effectiveness can be blunted by high-pressure selling techniques or 
by the consumer's lack of the knowledge necessary to make a proper 
decision.49 Without regulation of the substantive content of retail-
sales contracts, the uneducated and the unwary are left without any 
real protection.lio 
Michigan does have a fair trade practices act, 51 but its scope is 
severely limited. It only prohibits the false representation of prices 
in order to create the appearance of a reduction in price at a sale, 52 
the sending of unsolicited merchandise to a consumer,53 and the 
use of certain words when advertising goods for sale to the general 
public.54 The state lacks a comprehensive act that would give the 
attorney general the power to prevent any unfair or deceptive con-
sumer practice. Such an act would provide the substantive protec-
tion for the consumer that the disclosure acts fail to provide. 55 
The present False Advertising Act56 does give the attorney addi-
tional general powers to protect the public. He may initiate an 
action to enjoin the continuance of any violation of the Act.57 
Before such action can be taken, however, the attorney general 
must issue a cease-and-desist order that gives the respondent the 
49. Comment, 68 MICH. L. REv. 926, supra note 1, at 934-36. See also Note, Legal 
Knowledge of Michigan Citizens, 7l MICH. L. REv. 1463 (1973). 
50. Comment, 68 MICH L. REv. 926, supra note I, at 935-36. 
51. MICH. Co111P. LAws ANN. §§ 445.101-.109 (1967). 
52. MICH. Colin>. LAws ANN. § 445.106(a) (1967). 
53. MICH. Co11n>. LAws ANN. § 445.131 (Supp. 1973). The statute provides that the 
"receipt of any ••• unsolicited goods shall be deemed for all purposes an' uncondi-
tional gift to the recipient." For a discussion of this provision, see Pooley, Contracts, 
1970 Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 563, 580-83 (1971). 
54. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.101, .103-.105 (1967). The legislature declared 
that such words as "wholesale," "employee," "manufacturer," "miller," "wholesaler," and 
"broker," are improper and misleading when used in connection with the advertisement 
of products. 
55. For comprehensive consumer protection acts of other states, see Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§§ 407.010-.130 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to -220 (Supp. 1973); WASH. 
REv. CODE §§ 19.86.010-.920 (Supp. 1972). For a listing, complete through September 
1971, of states with legistlation that limits or restricts unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices, see Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TULANE L. REv. 724, 
757-60 (1972). 
56. MICH. Co11n>. LAws ANN. §§ 445.801-.809 (1967), as amended, MICH. Co!lfi>. LAws 
ANN, § 445.806a (Supp. 1973). The Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to make, publish, disseminate, 
circulate or place before the public any advertisement which contains any state-
ment or representation which is untrue, deceptive or misleading; or to advertise 
the availability of goods, wares or merchandise so as to misrepresent or unreason-
ably overstate the available supply in relation to reasonably expectable public 
demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity. 
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN, § 445.801 (1967). 
57. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.807(1) (1967). 
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opportunity to halt his activities within forty-eight hours.68 The 
attorney general can also accept voluntary assurances of discontinu-
ance in lieu of an action for an injunction.60 This power appears 
to be sufficiently broad to allow him to prevent false and deceptive 
advertising given sufficient resources for enforcement. 
The protection afforded by the above statutes is augmented by 
the attorney general's power to enjoin public nuisances. At common 
law, public or common nuisances were "such inconvenient or 
troublesome offenses as annoy the whole community in general, 
and not merely some particular person."00 The damages were re-
quired to be common to all members of the public. 61 The Michigan 
courts have recognized that the attorney general is a proper party 
to bring a public nuisance action. 62 However, in all such actions 
the court will balance the equities in order to determine if the 
facts of the cac;e require the issuance of an injunction. 63 Thus, the 
effectiveness of the attorney general's use of this power depends on 
the courts' willingness to grant injunctions. 
A major expansion in the definition of a public nuisance, with 
implications for consumer protection, occurred in Attorney General 
ex rel. Optometry Board of Examiners v. Peterson.64 The court 
held that the violation of a valid statute passed for the protection 
of the public health, safety, or welfare was a public nuisance.06 
The attorney general had brought the action to enjoin the de-
58. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.807(2) (1967). 
59. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.809 (1967). 
60. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •167. 
61. 3 W,, BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 11219·20, 
62. Attorney General ex rel. Optometry Bd. of Examiners v. Peterson, 381 Mich, 
445, 465•66, 164 N.W.2d 43, 53 (1969); Attorney General v. City of Howell, 231 Mich. 
401, 402·03, 204 N.W. 91, 91 (1925); Attorney General ex rel. Township of Wyoming v. 
City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 532-33, 141 N.W. 890, 900 (1913); Attorney 
General ex rel. Muskegon Booming Co. v. Evart Booming Co., 34 Mich. 462, 472 (1876). 
But see Attorney General v. Hane, 50 Mich. 447, 448, 15 N.W. 549, 549 (1883), where 
the court refused to allow the attorney general to bring civil action to restrain the 
maintenance of a mill dam that was alleged to be harmful to the public health. The 
court held that such a case should be prosecuted by the public and submitted to a jury. 
63. Roy v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 262 Mich. 663, 668, 247 N.W. 774, 776 (1933) ("A 
strict legal right, if incompatible with the equities of the case, docs not necessarily 
entitle one to equitable redress."); Fox v. Holcomb, 32 Mich. 494, 495.95 (1875). 
64. 381 Mich. 445, 164 N.W.2d 43 (1969). See Christenson, supra note 3, at 317-20, 
for a discussion of the use of an expanded doctrine of public nuisance. 
65. While there is a general rule that equity will not enjoin the commission of a 
crime, courts have been willing to disregard the rule. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelley v. 
Marco Sales Co., No. 13622C (Ingham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Dec. 8, 1972): "While 
courts generally do not interfere to prevent a breach of a penal ordinance or statute, 
they may properly do so under certain circumstances to prevent the continuance of a 
nuisance incidental thereto or arising therefrom." No. 13622C, opinion at 3. See also 
Township of Garfield v. Young, 348 Mich. 337, 341, 82 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1957), where 
the court said that, "if we have in truth a public nuisance, the fact that it is also a 
criminal act will not stay the chancellor's hand." 
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fendants' practice of examining eyes for contact lenses without the 
supervision of a licensed optometrist, oculist, or ophthalmologist. 
On appeal, the Michigan supreme court stated that 
[a]t common law, acts in violation of the law constitute a public 
nuisance. Harm to the public is presumed to fl.ow from the violation 
of a valid statute enacted to preserve public health, safety and wel-
fare. The attorney general, acting on behalf of the people, is a proper 
party to bring an action to abate a public nuisance or restrain unlaw-
ful acts which constitute a public nuisance. The existence of a crim-
inal or other penalty ... will not oust equity from jurisdiction.66 
The court said that the attorney general had the power to sue to 
enjoin the violation of a statute if that violation resulted in a public 
nuisance. The dissenting justices, in an opinion by Justice Adams, 
also agreed: "It may be concluded that, while courts of equity will 
not customarily interfere to prevent the breach of a penal ordinance 
or statute, they may exercise equity jurisdiction to abate public 
nuisances affecting health, morals, or safety, or to protect a public 
property right or interest."67 Justice Adams disagreed, however, 
with the court's position that the requisite showing of harm to the 
public could be presumed. In his examination of the facts, he could 
find no injury to the public as a result of the defendants' activities. 
The dissenters would have held that 
[p ]roof of a statutory violation of a regulatory statute that bears a 
reasonable relation to the public health and welfare, wher1:; such a 
statute contains criminal penalties that have not been pursued, 
where no injunctive remedy has been statutorily conferred, and 
where injury to the public by such violation or violations has not 
been made out, is insufficient to establish a public nuisance meriting 
the invocation of equity jurisdiction.68 
66. 381 Mich. at 465-66, 164 N.W.2d at 53. The majority did not cite any sources for 
its conclusions, but support can be found in English cases. See, e.g., Attorney-General v. 
Shrewsbury (Kingsland) Bridge Co., 21 Ch. D. 752, 755-56 (1882); Attorney-General v. 
Cockermouth Local Bd., L.R. 18 Eq. C. 172, 178 (1874). 
67. 381 Mich. at 457, 164 N.W.2d at 48. 
68. 381 Mich. at 465, 164 N."W.2d at 53. Justice Adams' claim that the plaintiff. 
must show injury to the public and that the injury should not be presumed is sup-
ported by an earlier opinion of the Michigan supreme court. In Township of Garfield 
v. Young, 348 Mich. 337, 82 N.W.2d 8-76 (1957), the court unanimously held tha.t the. 
plaintiff township could not secure an injunction for the violation of an ordinance 
passed to protect the public health, welfare, or safety unless it could prove actual injury 
to the public as a result of the violation. The cases can be distinguished in that Peterson 
involved a state statute, while Young involved a municipal ordinance. The court in 
Peterson, however, did not address the issue of presumption at all beyond categorically 
stating that it would presume injury to the public. But see Attorney-General v. Shrews-
bury (Kingsland) Bridge Co., 21 Ch. D. 752, 756 (1882) (attorney-general can secure an 
injunction restraining illegal activities without showing actual injury to the public). 
The Peterson majority also failed to answer the question of whether the defendant had 
the opportunity to overcome the presumption by presenting evidence to show that there 
was no actual public injury. 
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Even assuming that the dissenters are correct and that harm to 
the public is not to be presumed but must be proved, the holding 
that the violation of a statute enacted to protect the public health, 
safety, or welfare constitutes a public nuisance enjoinable by the 
attorney general gives the attorney general the opportunity to con-
trol serious violations of Michigan's consumer protection statutes.00 
This power is limited by the courts' discretionary power to refuse 
to issue an injunction even if a public nuisance is properly shown.70 
Again, the effectiveness of the attorney general's program will depend 
to a substantial degree upon the cooperation of the courts. 
Other weapons, which the attorney general can use to protect 
consumers from the acts of corporations that violate their charters 
by the misuse or abuse of their corporate powers, are his statutory71 
and common law72 quo warranto powers. His primary quo warranto 
power is found in a statute that gives him the power to seek ouster 
for misuse, nonuse, or surrender of corporate powers.78 A corpora-
tion that engages in any activity, including consumer fraud and 
pollution,74 that is not granted to it by its charter may be ousted 
from the exercise of that activity. The attorney general also has the 
power to bring quo warranto actions for violations of several specific 
statutes. For example, he may bring such an action under Mich-
igan's antitrust statutes.75 These quo warranto powers are limited 
The majority's opinion, a very brief one, may also be challenged on two other 
grounds. First, although the attorney general could have brought a criminal action 
against the defendant, the court did not discuss the inadequacy of the remedy at law. 
Second, the court failed to indicate whether it balanced the equities in order to 
determine if the facts of the case were such as to warrant the issuance of an injunction. 
Since the court issued an injunction, it must have decided both of these issues in favor 
of the attorney general. In the future, the attorney general should properly address 
these issues so that his activities will not be cut short by a tardy judicial recognition of 
bidden issues. 
69. See Comment, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 83 
U. CHI. L. REV, 590 (1966). 
'10. See note 63 supra. 
71. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.4501-.4545 (1968). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 600.3601 (1968), granting the circuit courts jurisdiction to restrain corporations 
from exercising rights, privileges, and franchises not granted to them by the state. 
'12. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •262-63. At common law, the attorney general 
had the authority, by a writ of quo warranto, to annul or vacate the charter of a 
corporation for violations of its charter because of misuse or abuse of corporate powers, 
73. MICH. Co11rP. LAws ANN. § 600.4521 (1968): 
If a corporation has, by a misuser, nonuser, or surrender, forfeited its corporate 
rights, privileges and francbises, the judgment in an action for quo warranto shall 
oust and exclude such corporation from corporate rights, privileges and franchises, 
and may dissolve the corporation. In addition to such judgment or in lieu thereof 
(except in case of such surrender), the court may impose a fine not exceeding 
$10,000.00 upon the corporation. The fine will not prevent further prosecution for 
any continuance or repetition of the conduct complained of. 
74. For an example of the use of this quo warranto power, see Attorney General v. 
Capitol Servs., Inc., 355 Mich. 545, 94 N.W .2d 814 (1959). 
75. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.702-,703 (1967). Other specific statutes authorizing 
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in two respects. First, they may be used only against corporate con-
sumer fraud or pollution. Second, they are limited by the marked 
reluctance of Michigan courts to allow their full exercise.76 The 
statutes allow the courts to exercise discretion in deciding whether 
to order an ouster or, in the alternative, to order the defendant to 
pay a fine.77 Fines are often an ineffective means of controlling fraud 
or pollution and can be looked upon by businesses as a cost of busi-
ness.78 In any case, the quo warranto power does provide an effec-
tive weapon for the attorney general in some cases. When dealing 
with situations where the only effective remedy is ouster or disso-
lution, the attorney general may persuade the courts to cooperate 
in his use of the quo warranto power to seek an ouster from any 
ultra vires actions that result in unfair consumer practices or pollu-
tion. 
Additional power to deal ·with consumer problems can be found 
in Michigan's licensing and regulation statutes. The attorney gen-
eral is expressly given the power to prosecute violations of some of 
these statutes.79 Under other statutes, where no express grant of 
power is found,80 the attorney general derives his power to prose-
cute violations from his general authority to represent all state 
agencies and boards. This broad power to prosecute and to prevent 
both the misuse of existing licenses and the unlicensed practice of 
a trade or profession is limited by the fact that the attorney general 
must generally wait for a request from the respective licensing agency 
the use of the attorney general's quo warranto power upon violation include the 
statute prohibiting contracts in the restraint of trade, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.735 
(1967); the statute regulating unfair discrimination and competition in the petroleum 
industry, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.797 (1967); and the fair-trade statute controlling 
the bakery and petroleum industries. MICH. COMP. LAWS A!'iN. § 445.180 (1967). 
76. See, e.g., Attorney General ex rel. James v. National Cash Register Co., 182 Mich. 
99, 126-28, 148 N.W. 420, 429 (1914). 
77. The quo warranto statute was amended in 1961 to reflect this reluctance on the 
part of the courts to enforce ouster or dissolution, See Revised Judicature Act. No. 236, 
§ 4521, [1961] Mich. Pub. 8: Loe. Acts 566. The statute now reads that the court "may 
dissolve the corporation." MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 600.4521 (1968) (emphasis added). 
It formerly read that "judgment shall be rendered that such corporation be ousted ••• 
and that the said corporation be dissolved." 4 MICH. COMP. LAws § 638,21 (1948) 
(emphasis added). 
78. See note 250 infra. 
79. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.525 (1967) (accountants); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 338.740 (1967) (foresters); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.572(2) (Supp. 
1973) (land surveyors and architects); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.1044 (1967) (mar-
riage counselors). 
80. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 331.651-.660 (1967), as amended, MICH. 
COMP. LAws ANN. § 331.654 (Supp. 1973) (nursing homes); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 338.251-.262 (1967), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.253 (Supp. 1973) 
(optometrists); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 338.1101-.1131 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 
1973) (pharmacists); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 451,201-.219 (1967), as amended, MICH. 
CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 451.211, .213, .217b (Supp. 1973) (real estate brokers). 
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or board before he may take action;81 his effective use of licensing 
statutes to protect the consumer will thus depend to a substantial 
degree upon the policies of each licensing agency. While there is in 
practice rarely any conflict betlveen the attorney general's office and 
the licensing agencies as to when action should be taken,82 this 
potential limit on the attorney general's power does exist. 
The attorney general is given a variety of other powers to deal 
with consumer problems. For example, he can prosecute for viola-
tions of Michigan's food and drug control statutes.83 He has power to 
control the activities of corporations under the antitrust laws84 and 
the authority to enforce securities statutes regulating public utili-
ties.85 The insurance industry is specificially subject to the attorney 
general's control,86 and he also has the power to enforce the statutes 
controlling misrepresentation and deception in the advertising of 
condominiums.87 Finally, the attorney general has the power to en-
force the Land Sales Act, 88 which prohibits unfair and deceptive 
trade practices in the sale of land. 
The powers discussed above give the attorney general a basis 
from which to attack consumer fraud problems. The lack of a com-
prehensive protection statute is partially overcome by the use of the 
quo warranto power to oust corporations from unfair and deceptive 
practices, and false advertising may be effectively controlled under 
the false advertising act. The lack of a comprehensive statute, how-
ever, cannot be totally overcome by the use of statutes that protect 
the consumer from only the most obvious of offenses. 
C. Environmental Protection Powers of the Attorney General 
The Michigan Constitution of 1963 declares the conservation and 
development of the state's natural resources to be of "paramount 
public concern" and gives the legislature an affirmative duty to pro-
tect the environment.89 As the chief law enforcement officer, the 
81. Styka Interview, supra note 19. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.10-14 
(1967) (marriage counselors). But see MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.220a (1967) (dentists). 
, 82. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
83. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 289.7 (1967). 
84. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.702-.703, .707, .735 (1967). 
85. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.302 (1967). 
86. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 500_.228, .230 (1967). 
87. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.28(3) (1967). 
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 565.801-.835 (Supp. 1973). The Act provides for 
enforcement through the Department of Licensing and Regulation, 
89. MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52: "The conservation and development of the natural 
resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the 
interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall 
provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state 
from pollution, impairment and destruction." 
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attorney general is charged with the enforcement of all laws that the 
legislature passes in fulfilling this constitutional mandate. 
While the attorney general is charged with this duty, he has con-
siderable discretion in deciding how to fulfill his role. It could be 
argued that he would be subject to a mandamus action for any 
breach of the duty to protect the environment.90 The difficulty with 
such an argument is that his duty is not a ministerial one, and only 
the fulfillment of a ministerial duty can be compelled by the courts 
under Michigan law.91 The attorney general's discretion as a prose-
cutorial official makes mandamus difficult to obtain.92 
The traditional source of the attorney general's power to deal 
with pollution is his common law power to abate public nuisances.93 
This power has been incorporated into several statutory provisions. 
Any plant constructed or operated in violation of the Sewage Disposal 
Plant Act94 is declared to be a public nuisance, and the attorney 
general is given the power to bring an abatement action.95 Likewise, 
under the Water Resources Commission Act, 96 the discharge into the 
waters of the state of any substance that is or may become injurious 
to the public health or to the environment is prima facie evidence of 
the existence of a public nuisance, and the attorney general may 
bring an abatement action.97 Under the Air Pollution Act,98 the 
90. Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving 
Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1132 (1970). 
91. Taylor v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 343 Mich. 440, 444, 72 N.W.2d 146, 148 (1955); 
Toan v. McGinn, 271 Mich. 28, 34, 260 N.W. 108, 111 (1935). The Michigan courts also 
require the plaintiff in a mandamus action to show "a clear legal right to performance 
of the specific act sought to be compelled," Iron County Bd. of Supervisors v. City of 
Crystal Falls, 23 Mich. App. 319, 322, 178 N.W.2d 527,529 (1970), and that the defend-
ant has "the clear legal duty to perform" the act. Toan v. McGinn, 271 Mich. 28, 34, 
260 N.W. 108, lll (1935). 
92. Mandamus will lie, however, in order to compel a public official to exercise 
the discretion vested in him. See, e.g., Shipman v. State Live-Stock Sanitary Commn., 
ll5 Mich. 488,491, 73 N.W. 817, 818 (1898); Cicotte v. County of Wayne, 59 Mich. 509, 
514, 26 N.W. 686, 687 (1886); People ex rel. Brower v. Judge of Wayne County Court, 
1 Mich. 359, 362 (1850). See also ICC v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 
224 U.S. 474, 484 (1912); Robinson, Securing Civil Rights in Michigan and the Growth 
of the Law, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 3, 49-50 n.181 (1968). But see Local 321, State, County 
&: Municipal Workers of America v. City of Dearborn, 3ll Mich. 674, 679-80, 19 
N.W.2d 140, 142 (1945) (dictum). 
93. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, Co111J11ENTARIES •219-20; 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JUIUSPRU· 
DENCE 202-04 (1836). See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra. 
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 123.271-.275 (1967). 
95. MICH. Co111P. LAws ANN. § 123.274 (1967). The action may also be brought by 
"any one or more of the property owners within the city or village in which said 
building, plant, or work is attempted to be placed in violation of this act." MICH. 
Co111P. LAws ANN.§ 123.274 {1967). 
96. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§§ 323.1-.13 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973). 
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(c) (Supp. 1973). The Act provi~es additional 
remedies. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973). 
98. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 336.11-.36 (1967), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN.§§ 336.12-.15, .17-.26, .28 (Supp. 1973). 
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attorney general's power to abate public nuisances caused by air 
pollution is preserved: "Nothing in this act ... shall abridge or alter 
rights of action or remedies now or hereafter existing, nor shall any 
provision of this act . • . be construed as estopping individuals • . . 
from the exercise of their respective rights to suppress nuisances or to 
prevent or abate air pollution."99 This statutory enactment of certain 
common law powers does not preclude the retention of the attorney 
general's general common law power to abate public nuisances,:1°0 
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act (EP A)101 gives the 
attorney general broad power to take action to protect the air, water, 
and other natural resources of the state. Under the Act the attorney 
general, or any other person or legal entity, may bring an action for 
declaratory or equitable relief, including damages,102 for the protec-
tion of the environment.103 Upon a showing that the defendant's 
activities are causing impairment or destruction of the environment, 
a court may grant temporary or permanent equitable relief or impose 
conditions upon the defendant to protect the environment.104 The 
success that the attorney general, or any party, will have in using the 
EPA again depends to a great degree on the will and ability of the 
courts.105 The courts are not required to grant relief whenever pollu-
tion is demonstrated; the Act provides that "[t]he court may grant 
temporary and permanent equitable relief . . . ."100 Unless the 
attorney general can persuade the court to take action, the Act will 
not substantially add to his power to control pollution. The consid-
erations that go into a court's decision under the Act will probably 
be very similar to those that go into its consideration of a public 
nuisance abatement action. At present, it is unclear whether the 
Michigan courts will interpret the Act to be a mandate for them to 
act in environmental matters.107 
99. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 336.34 (1967). 
100. See note 11 supra. 
IOI. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1973). For discussion of the 
EPA and its operation during its first years, see Sax &: Conner, Michigan's Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1004 (1972): Sax 
&: DiM:ento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience under the Mlclligan 
Environmental Protection Act - EcoLOGY L.Q. - (1974). 
102. While the draftsmen of the EPA did not envision the provision as allowing for 
a damage remedy, Interview with Prof. Jose_{)h L. Sax, principal draftsman of the 
Michigan EPA, March 15, 1974, it appears that the equitable restitutionary remedy 
of return to the status quo ante would be available. Cf. text accompanying notes 169· 
70 infra. For example, if the defendant's operation of a. landfill were enjoined under 
the EPA, the court could order him to restore the land to its original condition or to 
pay an amount of money sufficient to have the land restored to its original condition. 
103. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1973). 
104. MICH, COMP, LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(1) (Supp. 1973). 
105. Sax&: Conner, supra note 101, at 1005, 1031-50. 
106. MICH. Co111P. LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(1) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added). 
107. For discussion of the judicial response to the EPA as a source of substantive 
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Under the EPA, the attorney general is also permitted to petition 
to intervene in any administrative or licensing proceeding, or any 
judicial review of such a proceeding, by filing a pleading that asserts 
that the proceeding, or the action for judicial review, involves con-
duct that has, or is likely to have, harmful effects on the environ-
ment.108 If the agency or court finds that harmful effects will result, 
it cannot authorize or approve the conduct unless there are no 
feasible and prudent alternatives,109 Under the Act the power to 
allow the attorney general to intervene is discretionary; the Act only 
states that the agency or court "may permit" an intervention,110 
However, the attorney general may be able to intervene as a matter 
of right under his general intervention power.111 While ~he EPA 
itself gives him no such right, it does give him a weapon in his efforts 
to persuade the courts to cooperate in an environmental protection 
program, for the Act certainly expresses a legislative intent to allow 
the attorney general to implement the mandate of the Michigan 
constitution.112 
law, see Sax &: Conner, supra note 101, at 1054-64; Sax &: DiMento, supra note 101, man-
uscript at 105-10. See Brotz v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 2201 (Livingston County, Mich., 
Cir. Ct., Dec. 26, 1973), where the court disagreed with a probate court holding, In re 
Detroit Edison Co., No. 18146, at 11 (Livingston County, Mich., Probate Ct., Feb. 7, 
1973), that the EPA was only procedural in nature and did not grant any substantive 
powers to the courts. No. 2201, opinion at 2. See Sa.x &: DiMento, supra, manuscript at 
50-5la, See gener(llly Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 }4Rv. L, REv. 383 
(1908): StoJle, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV, L. R.Ev. 4, 12-16 (1936). 
108. MICH. Co11rP, LAWS ANN, § 691,1205(1) (Supp, 1973). 
109. MICH, CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1205(2) (Supp. 1973). 
110. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1205(1) (Supp. 1973). The Act does not confer 
an absolute right upon the attorney general or any other person to intervene. In any 
case, the agency or court may permit the intervention. In addition, an agency or court 
may be under a constitutional obligatioJl to allow intervention, :;ee note 89 $Upr(l, but 
the Act does not require it to do so. In at least one case, Wayne County Dept. of 
Health v, Chrysler Corp,, No. 166-224 (Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 1970), 
afjd., 4;! Mich. App. 235, 203 N.W.2d 912, motion for leave to appeal denied, 388 
Mich. 812 (1972), a court has held that intervention under the Act is permissive. 
The attorney general does, however, have the right to intervene under MICH. COMP. 
LAws ANN, § 14.28 (1967), which provides, in part, that the attorney general "may, 
when in his own judgment the interests of the state require it, intervene in and appear 
for the people of this state in any .•• court or tribunal, in any cause or matter, civil 
or criminal, in which the people of this state may be a party or interested." See Sax 
&: Conner, supra note 101, at 1069-72. 
111. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN. §§ 14.28, .101 (1967). 
112. The EPA provides that an action under the Act be brought •'in the circuit 
court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur." 
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1973). See Sax &: Conner, supra note 101, 
at 107~-76. However, the general statutes that apply to the attorney general allow him 
to bring suits in Ingham County. MICH, Co111P. LAws ANN. §§ 600.1631(a) (1968). The 
attorney general can use this venue power to pressure the violator by forcing him to 
present his case in a foreign tribunal. The defendant is, however, protected by the 
court rules from any venue location that would cause serious prejudice to his defense. 
See, e.g., MICH. Cr. R. 403: "[T]he venue of any civil action properly laid • • • may 
be changed to any other county by order of the court upon timely motion by one of 
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The Water Resources Commission Act113 and the Air Pollution 
Act114 establish administrative commissions that have the power to 
create and enforce permit systems115 and to promulgate standards to 
control pollution.116 In addition, in October 1973, Michigan, and 
hence these commissions, received authority from the federal govern-
ment, under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,117 to assume 
the responsibility of issuing and enforcing permits regulating the 
discharge of pollutants into lakes and streams.118 This authorization 
not only allows the state to enforce the more strict standards of the 
federal Act but also brings a substantial amount of federal funding 
to implement the program.110 As the legal representative of both 
commissions, the attorney general has the power and the duty to 
enforce the state and federal standards and permit systems. 
The permit systems themselves, however, may also create an 
obstacle to any program created by the attorney general to fight pollu-
tion, for it is not clear whether the attorney general may bring an 
action to enjoin an activity as a public nuisance where the business 
or corporation engaged in that activity is operating under a valid 
permit or within the standards of the regulatory agencies. The 
attorney general does have the power to intervene in the administra-
tive proceedings in which the permits are issued and the standards 
established.120 However, if he should feel that the public interest was 
the parties, for convenience of parties and witnesses, ••• or when an impartial trial 
cannot be had in the county wherein the action is pending." In fact, the expression 
of a legislative intent that an environmental action be brought in the county where 
the pollution is occurring may persuade the courts to side with the defendant on any 
motion for change of venue. 
ml. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 323.1-13 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973), 
114. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 336.11-.36 (1967), as amended, MICH, Co!IIP, LAWS 
ANN. §§ 336.12-.15, .17-.26, .28 (Supp. 1973). 
115. The permit systems for water pollution are established in MICH. COMP, LAws 
ANN. §§ 323.5(b), 323.7 (Supp. 1973). The air pollution permit system is established in 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 336.15(b) (Supp. 1973). 
116. The Air Pollution Control Commission has the power under MICH. COMP, 
LAws ANN. § 336.15(a) (Supp. 1973) to "[e]stablish standards for ambient air quality and 
for emissions." 
117. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (Supp. II, 1972). 
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. II, 1972). 
II9. The total amount of the federal grant to the state to assist in the enforcing of 
the strict pollution standards is approximately one million dollars for the fiscal year 
beginning July I, 1973. Approximately fifty thousand dollars is restricted for use in 
legal enforcement of standards. At the present time, the money in the grant that is 
allocated for legal enforcement has not yet been appropriated to the attorney general's 
office. A conflict with the Civil Service Commission has resulted in a refusal by the 
Commission to authorize the positions for the EPNRD. Consequently, the money is be• 
ing wasted. Interview with Stewart H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, En• 
vironmental Protection and Natural Resources Division, Michigan Attorney General's 
Office, Lansing, Michigan, Feb. 8, 1974, 
120. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 14.28 (1967). 
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not sufficiently protected by such intervention, he may want to bring 
an action to enjoin those activities as a public nuisance.121 Fortu-
nately, both the Water Resources Commission Act and the Air Pollu-
tion Act state that they shall not be construed so as to repeal any of 
the prior laws relating to pollution control.122 In addition, the Air 
Pollution Act explicitly allows municipalities to establish ordinances 
and regulations that are more strict than the minimum applicable 
requirements of the Act.123 These provisions indicate that the two 
Acts are to serve as one more additional tool in the government's fight 
against pollution. 
A recent Michigan case supports the proposition that the attorney 
general retains his common law power to abate public nuisances even 
if the defendant is operating in accordance with administrative regu-
lations. In White Lake Improvement Association v. City of White-
hall,124 an environmental protection association sought to enjoin the 
pollution of White Lake by the City of Whitehall and the Whitehall 
Leather Company. After agreeing that the plaintiff association had 
standing to challenge the city's action,125 the court concluded that, 
while the Water Resources Commission Act did not provide an ex-
clusive remedy for such pollution, it did provide a remedy that the 
plaintiff had not yet exhausted.126 Relying on the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction,127 the court required the association to bring its com-
121. There may be several reasons why the attorney general might not want to 
use this power to bring an action after an administrative agency has dealt with an issue. 
First, such an action would threaten a close working relationship between the attorney 
general and the agency. Second, if the attorney general repeatedly challenged the ac-
tions of the agencies, he would effectively destroy the agencies' ability to control pol-
lution through the permit system, for the public would properly conclude that it 
could no longer rely upon or base its activities on the permits issued by the agencies. 
Consequently, the attorney general should use his power sparingly, perhaps only 
when the agency is clearly wrong or when the agency's decision is motivated by 
factors other than environmental concerns. There has been only one recent case in 
which the attorney general has sought relief after agency action. That case was Kelley 
v. National Gypsum Co., No. 1918 (Alpena County, Mich. Cir. Ct., Sept. 25, 1973).· 
Telephone Interview with Stewart H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, Environ-
mental Protection and Natural Resources Division, Michigan Attorney General's Of-
fice, Lansing, Michigan, March 13, 1974. 
122. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 323.12 (water pollution), 336.35 (ait pollution) 
(1967). 
123. MICH. Cm,rP. LAWS ANN. § 336.36(1) (1967). 
124. 22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970). 
125. 22 Mich. App. at 271-74, 177 N.W.2d at 476-78. 
126. 22 Mich. App. at 276-79, 177 N.W .2d at 479-80. 
127. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been explained as follows: 
[l]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventionai experience of judges 
or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by 
Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so 
even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence 
serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and 
consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are 
secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally 
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plaint before the Water Resources Commission before it sought relief 
in the courts.128 
A party who, unlike the White Lake plaintiff, had complained to 
the Commission first would be required to seek judicial review of the 
Commission's action under the state Administrative Procedures 
Act.129 Then the party may "initiate an action in equity to abate the 
nuisance if it still feels itself aggrieved and entitled to equitable 
relie£";130 the court said that the Water Resources Commission Act 
"contemplates that existing common law remedies are not abol-
ished."131 The implication is that the attorney general would also be 
able to bring an action in equity if he first exhausted his administra-
tive remedies. 
Several recent circuit court decisions indicate that the Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act may provide some relief from the 
strict primary jurisdiction doctrine.132 The EPA provides, in part, 
that "[i]f administrative, licensing or other proceedings are required 
or available to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the 
court may remit the parties to such proceedings."133 This section was 
expressly designed to relieve the courts from the dictates of primary 
jurisdiction in actions under the EPA.184 Since the attorney general's 
powers to enjoin pollution under the EPA are largely coextensive 
with his powers to abate many public nuisances, the courts should 
likewise limit their application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
in common law actions to those cases where administrative action is 
clearly warranted. When faced with a situation similar to that pre-
sented in White Lake, a court may no longer be required to adhere 
exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances 
underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by 
specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more fle.'>:ible pro-
cedure. 
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952). See generally Con-
visser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and its Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315 (1956); 
Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1037 (1964). 
128. 22 Mich. App. at 282, 177 N .W .2d at 482. 
129. 22 Mich. App. at 282, 177 N.W .2d at 482. See MICH. CoMP, LAws ANN. 
§§ 24.201-.315 (Supp. 1973). 
130. 22 Mich. App. at 282, 177 N.W.2d at 482. 
131. 22 Mich. App. at 279, 177 N.W.2d at 481. 
132. See Water Resources Commn. v. Chippewa County, No. 1255 (Chippewa 
County, Mich., Cir. Ct., May 27, 1971) (Opinion on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment): Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield, 3 E.R.C. 1893 
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972). Cf. Kelley v. National Gypsum Co., No. 1918 (Alpena County, 
Mich., Cir. Ct., Sept. 25, 1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 202-05 infra. See 
also Sax&: Conner, supra note 101, at 1019-27. 
133. MtcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added), 
134. Sax&: Conner, supra note 101, at 1019-20. 
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intractably to the principle of primary jurisdiction.135 Because the 
predominant rationale behind the doctrine was to follow the legisla-
tive intent for uniformity and for utilization of agency expertise, this 
later expression of legislative intent should be read as a directive to 
the courts to free themselves from the strictures of primary jurisdic-
tion in environmental matters and to base their decisions on the 
need to protect the environment.136 The Water Resources Commis-
sion Act137 and the Air Pollution Act138 support this thesis in that 
they also contemplate a system with dual remedies. 
In an equitable action to abate a public nuisance, the existence of 
a permit may cause further problems for the attorney general in that 
the defendant may claim its permit as a defense to the attorney gen-
eral's action. The Michigan courts, however, have held that "[n]o 
state agency is free to maintain a nuisance, and hence it cannot per-
mit or require another person to do so."139 
135. See Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield, 3 E.R.C. 1893, 
1901 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972): 
This Court is of the opinion that White Lake, and the rules set out therein, is 
no longer controlling in that [the Environmental Protection Act] denies the Water 
Resources Commission primary jurisdiction in matters such as are now before the 
Court. The primary jurisdiction doctrine was the controlling factor employed by 
the Court of Appeals in its disposition of White Lake but such doctrine was • • • 
employed in the absence of the language now found in [the Environmental Pro-
tection Act]. It should be understood herein that this Court does not disagree 
with the rationale for nor the necessity of the primary jurisdiction doctrine but 
merely points out that the same is not absolutely controlling herein. 
136. In Water Resources Commn. v. Chippewa County, No. 1255 (Chippewa 
County, Mich., Cir. Ct., May 27, 1971) (Opinion on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment), the court noted that the administrative process normally should not be by-
passed. However, the court continued: "[A)s the Court of Appeals indicated, there are 
no hard and fast rules for application of the 'primary jurisdiction' doctrine; and 
whether to apply it to a particular case depends upon many circumstances •••• The 
interest of justice will not be served by the Court passing the problem back to the 
Water Resources Commission at this time." No. 1255, opinion at 5. 
137. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.6 (Supp. 1973): "[I]n addition to the remedies 
provided for in this act [any violation] may be abated according to law in an action 
brought by the attorney general in a court of competent judisdiction." 
138. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 336.34 (1967). 
139. Ebel v. Saginaw County Bd. of Road Commrs., 386 Mich. 598, 607, 194 N.W .2d 
365, 369 (1972). The court also said: 
Compliance with the [public service] commission's orders for the installation and 
maintenance of certain [railroad crossing] warning devices are among the circum-
stances and certainly evidence the jury should consider in determining whether the 
railroad was negligent, but it cannot be said as a matter of law that compliance 
with such commission's order is to be equated as freedom from negligence • 
• • • It cannot be said however that under all circumstances compliance with an 
order of the commission absolves a railroad from liability for maintaining a nui-
sance in fact. 
886 Mich. at 606-07, 194 N.W .2d at 368-69 (emphasis original). 
The EPA gives the courts the authority to examine the standards and rules prom-
ulgated by an administrative agency and, if necessary to protect properly the en• 
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The attorney general also has the authority under the Water 
Resources Commission Act and the Air Pollution Act to seek restitu-
tion for "the full value of the injuries done to the natural resources 
of the state and the costs of surveillance and enforcement by the state 
resulting from the ... violation."140 This remedy is in addition to 
injunctive relief and a prescribed fine and is supplemented by the 
attorney general's continuing common law power to recover damages 
for injuries done to the lands or property of the state.141 
Several recent statutes give the attorney general additional powers 
to protect the natural resources of the state. For example, the Inland 
Lakes and Streams Act of I 972142 is, as its title indicates, designed to 
vironment, to order and determine new standards. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(2) 
(Supp. 1973), provides: 
, In granting relief ••• where there is involved a standard for pollution or for 
an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed by rule or otherwise, by an instru-
mentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, the court may: 
(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the standard. 
(b) When a court finds the standard to be deficient, direct the adoption of a 
standard approved and specified by the court. 
When the attorney general brings his action, the court now has the power to review 
the administrative standards de novo. The court would not be involved in the judicial 
review of an administrative order. See Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township 
of Northfield, 3 E.R.C. 1893, 1901 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972). The court, upon finding that 
the administrative standards do not sufficiently protect the environment, may order 
the adoption of standards that it feels arc proper. See 3 E.R.C. at 1901: "[The court] 
can direct the Water Resources Co=ission to adopt a different pollution standard 
without a judicial review of Commission proceedings wherein standards were adopted 
and by virtue of (the Environmental Pxotection Act] can direct the Commission to 
adopt different standards •••• " 
140. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 323.10 (water pollution), 336.26 (air pollution) 
(Supp. 1973). There is an inconsistency in the two damage provisions with respect to 
the attorney general's power to bring an action for recovery without agency recom-
mendation. In the air pollution provision, the attorney general is given the power to 
file an action for recovery "at the request of the commission." In a 1972 amendment 
to the Water Resources Commission Act the attorney general is simply given the 
power to bring the recovery action. Act of June 5, 1972, No. 159, (1972] Mich. Pub. 
&: Loe. Acts 257 (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973)). The legis-
lature omitted the phrase "at the request of the department of conservation," which 
had been in the earlier version of the Act. Act of Oct. 29, 1965, No. 405, § 10, [1965] 
Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 825. Allowing the attorney general to bring an action for 
water pollution on his own initiative but not allowing him to do so in the air pollu• 
tion field is illogical and calls for legislative correction. The proper approach is to 
allow the attorney general to bring an action for recovery on his own initiative in both 
cases. 
141. At common law, the attorney general had the power to prosecute all actions 
necessary for the protection of the property and revenues of the Crown, 3 W. BLACK• 
STONE, COMMENTARIES •257-58, and the power to bring an action by information to re• 
cover damages for wrongs done to the land or to the possessions of the Crown. Id. 
at •261-62. 
142. MICH. CollfP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.951-.965 (Supp. 1973). Other statutes deslgrtcd 
to protect the natural resources of the state include the Shorelands Protection and 
Management Act of 1970, M1CH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 281.631-.645 (Supp. 1973): the 
Natural River Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.761-.776 (Supp. 1973): the 
Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Act of 1972, MICH. Cm,tP. LAWS ANN. §§ 282,101-,ll7 
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protect and regulate Michigan lakes and streams. Enforcement of the 
Act is delegated to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources/43 
which is represented by the attorney general's office. The ·legislature 
has also recently enacted various statutes to control specific forms of 
pollution. For example, the 1969 Liquid Industrial Wastes Act144 
controls the disposal of liquid industrial wastes into Michigan's 
waters by requiring that persons engaged in discharging such wastes 
from industrial premises be licensed and bonded. While the initial 
enforcement powers are vested in the Water Resources Commis-
sion,145 the attorney general's office, as the legal representative of the 
Commission, wields the enforcement power. His power is limited by 
the requirement that he must await agency referral. If a violation of 
the Acts constitutes a public nuisance, however, he should be able to 
act after he has resorted to the agency. 
II. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CURRENT UTILIZATION OF His 
POWERS 
An examination of how the Michigan attorney general's common 
law and statutory powers are currently being used to protect the 
public interest involves, first, a description of the general depart-
mental structure of the attorney general's office and, second, a survey_ 
of the office's current activities. 
The department is currently separated into twenty-one divi-
sions,146 each of which represents several different state agencies and 
boards. At the present time, the Environmental Protection and 
Natural Resources Division (EPNRD) represents agencies and boards 
involved in environmental protection. The divisions dealing with 
consumer protection problems are the Consumer Protection and 
Charitable Trusts Division (CPD), the Licensing and Regulation 
Division (LRD), and the Special Litigation Division (SLD). This 
structure does not preclude activities in consumer and environmental 
areas by other divisions if such issues arise in the course of their 
representation of other agencies and boards. This allocation of 
(Supp. 1973); the Mineral Well Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 319.211-.236 (Supp. 
1973); and the Wilderness and Natural Areas Act of 1972, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 322.751-.763 (Supp. 1973). 
143. MICH, COMP. LA.ws ANN.§ 281.963(1) (Supp. 1973). 
144. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.271-.280 (Supp. 1973). Other examples of re-
cent legislation designed to control specific forms of pollution include the Cleaning 
Agents Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.231-.236 (Supp. 1973); the Watercraft 
Pollution Control Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.331-.342 (Supp. 1973); 
and the Sewage Treatment Facilities Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.111-.128 
(1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973). 
145. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 323.279-.280 (Supp. 1973). 
146. Styka Interview, supra note 19. The Attorney General's office is created. by 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 16.150-.154 (1967). 
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responsibility allows assistant attorneys general to specialize in one 
area of the law and thereby acquire the expertise necessary to pro-
vide effective protection. 
The current activity of the divisions is limited to a great extent 
by inadequate resources.147 In comparison with offices in other states, 
the Michigan attorney general's office is seriously understaffed in its 
consumer and environmental divisions.148 No amount of organiza-
147. Styka Interview, supra note 19. For an example of an innovative attempt to 
mitigate the problems of limited resources, see Burch, supra note 3, at 164-65, where the 
Maryland Attorney General describes his use of Jaw students in a work-study program, 
Partially funded by the federal government, the program provides the attorney gen-
eral's office with the services of high quality Jaw students at minimal cost to the state, 
148. Currently Michigan has eight full-time assistant attorneys genera], no in• 
vestigators, and six clerical workers assigned to the Environmental Protection and 
Natural Resources Division. The attorney general has assigned three full-time assistant 
attorneys general, two investigators, one complaint examiner, and four clerical workers 
to the Consumer Protection and Charitable Trusts Division. These three assistant 
attorneys general must administer all charitable trusts, in addition to their consumer 
protection activities. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
Figures for environmental attorneys in other states' attorneys general's offices can 
be found in National Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office of 
the Attorney General Special Report, Environmental Control Questionnaires: Com• 
pilation of Responses 3-5 (August 22, 1973) [hereinafter Environmental Control Ques-
tionnaires]. The following table gives the figures for the environmental staffs of va-
rious states: 
Number of Authorized Staff Positions in the Attorney General's Office 




Housed in State 
Clerical- Environmental 
State Attorneys Secretary Investigators Agencies 
Alabama IFT;3PT lFr;lPT None lFT 
California 9½FT 1FT;9PT None 13FT 
Connecticut 4FT 3FT None None 
Florida 2FT IFT None 9FT 
Illinois 19FT;l7PT l0FT 7FT 14FT 
Kentucky 2FT 2Fr None 4FT 
Massachusetts 5FT lFT 2FT 6FT 
Michigan SFT 5FT None None 
Minnesota 4FT;2PT 2FT None 7FT 
Missouri lFT;lPT 2PT None None 
New Jersey 12FT 5FT None 2FT 
New York 15FT 7FT 2FT 22FT 
Ohio 24FT 9FT 2FT None 
Pennsylvania 2PT 2PT None lFT 
Texas SFT 4FT None 31FT 
Virginia 3FT;lPT IFT;IPT None None 
West Virginia 3FT 2FT None None 
Wisconsin 6FT 2FT;IPT IFT IlFT 
Figures for consumer attorneys in other states can be found in National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office of the Attorney General and 
Consumer Protection Committee, State Programs for Consumer Protection 13 (bee, 
1973) [hereinafter State Programs]. The following table provides representative figures: 
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tion can overcome the problems inherent in a severe lack of re-
sources.149 However, the attorney general is attempting to protect the 
public interest as best he can. 
The attorney general must accomplish two objectives if he is to 
protect the public interest effectively in these areas. First, he must 
secure the cessation of the harmful activities; second, he must secure 
restitution to both the public and the state for harm done.100 The 
settlement of a case without a remedy that prevents the continuation 
of the harmful practice merely reduces the attorney general's action 
to a cost of doing business, and prosecution without restitution may 
discourage complaints and leave the public without an adequate 
remedy.151 The lack of resources has, of necessity, led to the placing 
Number of Authorized Staff Positions in the Attorney General's Office 
for Consumer Protection Matters 
(FT=Full-time; PT=Part-time) 
Clerical-
State Attorneys Secretary Investigators Others" 
Alabama IPT IPT None !Fr 
California 14FT !OFT 3FT 4Fr 
Colorado 3Fr 3Fr 2Fr 4Fr 
Illinois 12FT;l8PT 38FT;3PT 20FT;l2PT 6PT 
Kentucky 4FT 5FT None llFT 
Maryland 2FT 4Fr 5FT 3FT;l5PT 
Michigan 3FT 6FT lFT 3FT 
Minnesota 4FT 4FT lFT 4FT 
Missouri 2FT;2PT 3FT;3PT 4FT;lPT 3FT 
NewYork 33Fr;10PT 19FT;4PT 20FT;IPT IFT 
North Carolina 3FT 5FT 4FT 3FT;2PT 
Ohio 12PT IOFT;2PT 9FT 8FT;3PT 
Pennsylvania ISFT 38FT 31FT 3FT 
Texas 15FT 8FT;2PT None 3FT;5PT 
Wisconsin 7FT 12FT;2PT SFT 4FT;l3PT 
• Includes education specialists, complaint examiners, interviewers, and student 
aides. 
149. Proper organization can, however, mitigate the problems that arise when a 
prosecutorial office is faced with a shortage of resources. Perhaps it would be worth 
the cost to reassign two or three assistant attorneys general from, for example, the 
highway division to consumer or environmental protection. While the representation 
provided to the Highway Department may suffer, the benefits gained by the addition 
of attorneys to the consumer and environmental divisions may outweigh the loss. 
The attorney general's office should seriously consider such a reallocation of resources. 
150. Styka Interview, supra note 19. See OFFICE oF ATrORNEY GENERAL, supra 
note 11, at 411 CTohn C. Danforth, Attorney General of Missouri): 
I think that there are basically two theories for the operation of a consumer 
protection program. One ••• is that the objective of such a division is to procure 
refunds for consumers who complain to the division from businesses which may 
have engaged in deceptive practices. The other alternative is to view the consumer 
protection division less as an agency to procure restitution and more as an agency 
to prevent deceptive practices. 
151. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 411. See also W. MAGNUSON & 
J. CARPER, supra note I, at 55-56, quoting Michael Frank, Attorney, Washington, D.C., 
legal aid office: 
Many companies know they are violating the law, but they do it deliberately 
because they are sure that few poor people will show up in court to defend 
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of one goal over the other in some states.162 Fortunately, the approach 
taken by the Michigan attorney general's office153 is to seek the fulfill-
ment of both goals. 
A. Consumer Protection Activities 
The major activity of the attorney general with regard to con-
sumer protection is the mediation of consumer complaints.161 When 
a complaint is received in the Consumer Protection and Charitable 
Trusts Division, the complaint examiner and her staff review it and 
either request more information from the consumer or contact the 
businessman named. The businessman is informed that a complaint 
has been filed, is sent a copy of the complaint, and is asked to explain 
his actions. The CPD then asks him to refund the complainant's 
money and to agree to refrain from such activities in the future.166 
If the CPD succeeds, its goals of obtaining restitution and of stopping 
the fraudulent activity are fulfilled, and the case is considered 
closed.156 The value of such an informal resolution is that, if properly 
supported by a program of immediate prosecution when informal 
agreement cannot be secured, it allows for the conservation of 
resources, quick results, and a wide range of activities. The informal 
agreements are, of course, not enforceable, and their efficacy is 
dependant upon the good faith of the violator. However, if the 
themselves, and the company will get a default judgment. If they lose a case, the 
company won't appeal, because they don't want a precedent against them to be 
set and to appear on the books. It is little matter to these dishonest firms if they 
lose one small sale or suit. They are still in business, and they have their healthy 
margin of profit. We catch them on one; they fleece twenty. 
152. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 411. 
153. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
154. Interview with Edwin M. Bladen, Assistant Attorney General, Consumer 
Protection & Charitable Trusts Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, 
Michigan, August 27, 1973 [hereinafter Bladen Interview]. 
155. During the year of 1973, the CPD handled 8208 citizen complaints and secured 
recoveries in the amount of $215,651.74. In 1972, the division handled '1293 complaints 
and $249,331.43 was recovered. In 1971, 6089 complaints were processed, with re• 
coveries of $165,959.45. 
While the amounts recovered are quite substantial, they in no way approach the 
amounts lost by Michigan consumers every year to consumer fraud. It has been CS• 
timated that the Michigan consumers lose over a million dollars annually as a result 
of unfair and deceptive trade practices. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, at l·E, col. 4. 
Another problem caused by the lack of resources in the CPD is that it takes ap• 
proximately two weeks to handle a complaint. If sufficient resources were provided, 
the time would be two to three days. Interview with Mrs. Fern Wright, Complaint 
Examiner, Consumer Protection & Charitable Trusts Division, Michigan Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, Lansing, Michigan, February 8, 19'74 [hereinafter Wright Interview), 
156. The CPD estimates that approximately 40 per cent of the complaints result in 
a successful recovery for the consumer. The other 60 per cent end in reference to other 
units of government or reach a stalemate. Telephone Interview with Edwin M. Bladen, 
Assistant Attorney General, Consumer Protection & Charitable Trusts Division, Michi-
gan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 15, 1974 [hereinafter Bladen 
Telephone Interview]. 
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attorney general adopts a policy of swift and forceful prosecution, 
where possible, upon the breach of such agreements, the threat of 
prosecution might be sufficient to compel compliance. 
While the attorney, general lacks the power to bring an action 
based simply upon an allegation of unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices, if the businessman refuses to cooperate, the attorney general 
does have several alternatives. As previously noted,157 he can use his 
recently expanded power to sue to abate public nuisances for viola-
tions of consumer protection statutes. In People ex rel. Kelley v. 
Marco Sales Co.,158 the CPD successfully obtained an injunction 
restraining the defendant's use of the mails to conduct a lottery con-
trary to Michigan's lottery statute.159 The defendant was sending 
Michigan residents punch cards that purportedly gave- the recipient 
and his friends the opportunity to ·win a free grandfather chime clock. 
After concluding that the defendants were operating the scheme in 
such a way as to deceive and mislead Michigan consumers, the CPD 
was able to bring an action to enjoin the activities as a public 
nuisance under the Peterson rationale.160 
The case demonstrates another advantage of the Peterson rule. 
Because the defendant was an Illinois corporation with no agents or 
offices in Michigan, the attorney general was forced to use Michigan's 
long-arm statute161 to secure limited personal jurisdiction over it. 
Under the statute, the commission of a tort, or activities that lead to 
a tort, in Michigan is sufficient to provide jurisdiction.162 Because the 
violation of a statute passed to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare-in this case, the lottery statute-is a pubHc nuisance ~d 
thus a tort, the court f,ound it had jurisdiction. The CPD's use of the 
expanded definition of public nuisance is a major part of the 
attorney general's consumer protection· program.163 
157. See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra. 
158. No.13622C (Ingham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Dec. 8, 1972). 
159. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.372-.376 (1967), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 750.372a (Supp. 1973). 
160. See te.'!:t accompanying notes 64-69 supra. 
161. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.715(1) (1968). The court admitted that: limited 
personal jurisdiction could not be secured under the general jurisdictional · section, 
MICH, COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.715(1) (1968), which provides that "[t]he transaction of 
any business within the state" will provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. No. 
13622C, opinion at 6. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); 
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
162. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.715(2) (1968), which pi;-ovides that "[t]he doing 
or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an 
action for tort" will provide a sufficient basis for limited personal jurisdiction. Tliis 
section of the long-arm statute was held co~titutional in Woods v. Edgewater Amuse-
ment Park, 381 Mich. 559, 165 N.W.2d 12 (1969). See also Travelers Health Assn. v. 
Virginia ex rel. State Corporation Commn., 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (issuance of injunction 
restraining Nebraska firm from the use of the mails in Virginia to deliver insurance 
certifications held not a violation of due process); Gray v. American Radiator & Stand-
ard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
163. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. 
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The CPD has also been active under the authority given it by the 
deceptive advertising statutes.164 For example, the division has 
attempted to prevent bait advertising in the sale of magazine sub-
scriptions by Time Incorporated, and its subsidiary, Family Publica-
tions Service, Inc., who were luring customers by offers of "free" 
subscriptions. Their advertisements concealed the total costs of sub-
scriptions and the duration of the subscription contracts. The CPD 
issued a cease-and-desist order, which notified the respondent that, 
unless the activities complained of were stopped within forty-eight 
hours, the attorney general would initiate an action to secure an 
injunction.165 The respondents agreed to enter into a voluntary assur-
ance of compliance, in which they agreed both to stop the deceptive 
advertising and to refund all monies paid by consumers for subscrip-
tions.166 If the respondents had not agreed to the voluntary assurance 
of discontinuance, the CPD could have brought an action under the 
Act to secure an injunction.167 The advantage of securing a voluntary 
assurance of discontinuance is that the CPD can force the respondent 
to agree to refund monies gained as a condition of that agreement. 
If the CPD is forced to take the case to court in order to secure an 
injunction, the prospects of a recovery for the consumer are less, 
since the attorney general has no statutory power to sue for restitu-
tion on belialf of the public.168 
A recent California case,169 however, may prove useful to the CPD 
164. M1CH, CoMP, LA.ws ANN. §§ 445.801-.809 (1967), as amended, M1CH, COMP, LAws 
ANN. § 445.806 (Supp. 1973). 
165. Notice to Cease and Desist, In re Time Inc., No. 70-1018 (Nov. 19, 1970), 
Other recent examples of notices to cease and desist include: In re World Wide Sys• 
tems, Inc., No. 73-1001 (March 6, 1973) (respondent ordered to stop advertising that 
it had job positions available for truck drivers when it in fact had no such openings); 
In re New York Carpet World, No. 72-1001 Gan. 10, 1972) (respondent ordered to dis• 
continue advertising that claimed 50 per cent savings on carpeting that sold at a 
"regular price" of $7.99 per square yard when carpeting's actual regular price was 
$4.25 per square yard); In re Reader's Digest, No. 70-1020 (Dec. 2, 1970) (respondent 
ordered to cease advertising in a manner that created false and fraudulent impressions 
of endorsement or participation in promotional games). In 1973, 29 cease-and-desist 
orders were issued. In 1972, 6 were issued, and 12 were issued in 1971. Bladen Inter• 
view, supra note 154. 
166. People ex rel. Leonard v. Harrell, No. 16693 (Genesee County, Mich., Cir. Ct,, 
Nov. 25, 1970). 
167. MICH, CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 445.807(1) (1967). See, e.g., People ex rel. Attorney 
General v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 37 Mich. App. 447, 467-68, 195 N.W.2d 43, 1,3 
(1972), where the Michigan court of appeals reversed a trial court decision refusing 
to issue an injunction against the defendant cosmetic corporation's marketing scheme, 
which violated the false advertising act by using "misrepresented facts, exaggerated 
claims and statistics, undisclosed facts, and false advertising." 
168. Cf. text accompanying notes 28-35 supra. 
169. People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 245, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 
(1973). The court noted that "a court of equity may exercise the full range of it! 
inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice between parties, restoring if 
necessary the status quo ante as nearly as may be achieved •••• In particular, in an 
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in its efforts to secure restitution for the consumer in conjunction 
with an action to enjoin deceptive advertising. The California 
supreme court held that the state attorney general could secure 
restitution for the deceived consumers in an action to enjoin viola-
tions of California's deceptive advertising act.170 The Michigan 
courts have not yet decided if they have the power, under the tradi-
tional doctrine that an equity court may render full and complete 
relief once its jurisdiction has been properly invoked,171 to order a 
return to the status quo ante in an action by the attorney general 
under the Michigan deceptive advertising statute. Because its goal is 
to secure both restitution for the defrauded consumer and cessation 
of the deceptive practices, the CPD is currently attempting to estab-
lish that theory in Michigan.172 · 
Because of the lack of a comprehensive consumer protection act, 
the CPD uses the attorney general's quo warranto power to attack 
deceptive trade practices outside the reach of the deceptive advertis-
ing statute. These powers are presently used in two ways; If a cor-
poration misuses its powers in a way that involves unfair trade 
practices, the CPD will bring an action to secure a partial ouster 
from those abusive practices. If a corporation uses otherwise legal 
means that are outside its granted powers to accomplish a purpose 
inimical to the public welfare, the CPD will bring an action, for 
partial ouster from that ultra vires act.173 The purpose of these quo 
action by the Attorney General under [the false advertising act] a trial court has the 
inherent power to order, as a form of ancillary relief, that the defendants make an 
offer to make restitution to the consumers found to have been defrauded." 9 Cal. 3d 
at 247, 507 P,2d at 1402, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194. The court also said that it would not 
allow the lower court to award exemplary damages unless the courts were given explicit 
statutory authority to do so. See Comment, Fraudulent Advertising: The Right of a 
Public Attorney to Seek Restitution for Consumers, 4 PAC. L.J. 168 (1973). 
170. CAL. Bus.&: PROF. CODE § 17535 (West 1964), as amended, (West Supp. 1974). 
A 1972 amendment specifically allows a government attorney to bring a restitution 
action along with an action for an injunction. 
171. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS §§ 72, 174 (1838). See Hecht 
Company v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530, 551 (1913) 
("A court of equity ought to do justice completely, and not by halves."). 
172. See People ·ex rel. Kelley v. Anderson, No. 15875-C (Ingham County, Mich., 
Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 1, 1973), ,irhere the attorney general, using Peterson's expanded 
definition of public nuisances, see text accompanying notes 64-69 supra, is seeking an 
injunction for the abatement of a public nuisance-the violation of the deceptive ad-
vertising act. The attorney general has also asked that the court "order that the 
status quo ante be restored as near may be, including ordering Defendants herein to 
refund to each and every person within the State of Michigan such sums of money as 
they may have expended as the result of reliance on the representations and advertise-
ments of Defendants." No. 15875-c, complaint at 6; 
173. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. For an example of a partial ouster action, 
see Michigan Mobile Homeowners Assn. v. Chateau Enterprises, Inc., No. X72-4678 
(l\facomb County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Oct. 6, 1972), where the attorney general intervened 
and sought an injunctive order excluding the defendants "from exceeding the authority 
expressed in defendants' corporate charters and abusing or misusing the franchise 
power granted by the State of Michigan." No. X72-4678, complaint at 2. 
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warranto actions is not necessarily to secure a total ouster of the 
corporation, although such action is possible if the CPD feels that 
the defendant is incapable of engaging in business without involving 
itself in unfair practices.174 Rather, the goal is only to obtain a partial 
ouster from the unfair practices.175 The use of the quo warranto 
power alone will not provide any form of restitution to the consumer, 
unless the attorney general can persuade the court to agree to a 
return to the status quo ante as a part of its injunctive order of ouster. 
Consequently, the CPD uses the threat of quo warranto actions to 
secure voluntary consent judgments-which, inter alia, require 
restitution.176 
The CPD is active in other areas of consumer protection. For 
example, it has been involved in the policing of unconscionable con-
tracts, 177 in court proceedings on the question of the proper venue in 
a debtor-creditor relationship (must the creditor sue the debtor 
where the debtor resides or where the creditor has its place of busi-
ness?), 178 and in the prevention of pyramid-sales schemes.170 These 
174. For a recent example of an action seeking total ouster, see People ex rel. 
Kelley v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., No. 2676 (Grand Traverse County, Mich., Cir. Ct., 
filed Dec. 28, 1971), where the attorney general is asking for total ouster because of 
the defendant's alleged unfair and deceptive trade practices. 
175. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. 
176. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelley v. American Central Corp., No. 15398-C (Ing• 
ham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Aug. 23, 1973) where the attorney general forced the de• 
fendant to comply with the provisions of the Michigan Land Sales Act, MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. §§ 565.801-.835 (Supp. 1973). The defendant also agreed to submit to an 
arbitration panel all unsettled rescission claims of defrauded consumers. 
177. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelley v. Cadillac Outfitting Furniture Co., No. 
191336R (Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Nov. 21, 1972), where the attorney general 
brought a quo warranto action against a furniture company soliciting inner-city busi-
ness in Detroit, alleging that the defendant's business practices were unfair, uncon-
scionable, and racially discriminatory. The attorney general secured a consent dissolu-
tion of the company and an injunction against the defendant excluding it from en-
gaging in mercantile or credit business. 
The attorney general has also been active in enforcing the Michigan Retail In-
stallment Sales Act, MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.851-.872 (1967), as amended, 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.851a, .852, .865 (Supp. 1973). See, e.g., In re Domestic 
Credit Corp., No. 11647-C (Ingham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., April 30, 1970) (defend-
ants voluntary agreed to discontinue the inclusion of prohibited conditions and pro-
visions). 
178. See, e.g., Baby Prods. Co. v. Piskoti, No. DA-201 (Oakland County, Mich,, 
Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1972) (Stipulation), where the plaintiff stipulated that it would 
permanently "refrain in all future litigation from filing any suit to enforce any of 
Plaintiff-Appellee's contracts in any District Court C.'i:cept the District Court in which 
the defendant of said litigation resides." No. DA-2-01, stipulation at I. This concession 
by the plaintiff is important for three reasons. First, it prevents this partcular com-
pany from using venue statutes to pressure the consumer. Second, and more impor-
tantly, it is a strong precedent for future action by the attorney general. Third, it 
serves as notice to corporations that the attorney general will act if venue statues are 
used improperly. The stipulation was incorporated into an injunction by order of the 
court. 
179. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelley v. Dare To Be Great, Inc., No. 6650 (Washtenaw 
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activities, with those discussed above, have provided a measure of 
protection for the Michigan consumer. Again, the degree of this pro-
tection is limited by the lack of a comprehensive consumer protection 
act and by the limited resources available to the CPD. 
The Special Litigation Division is also active in consumer protec-
tion. Created in 1968, the SLD is primarily involved in representing 
the public at rate hearings before the Michigan Public Service Com-
mission.180 The attorney general established the division because the 
Public Service Division of his office, the legal representative of and 
advisor to the Public Service Commission, was not adequately repre-
senting the public interest at Commission hearings.181 Since 1969, 
the SLD has intervened in every major rate-increase hearing before 
the Commission in an effort to hold down increases in Michigan's 
public utility rates.182 While the SLD intervention has been some-
what effective,183 the division is not properly staffed and funded. The 
Commission is now capable of handling three major rate-increase 
hearings simultaneously,184 and the effectiveness of the SLD's inter-
vention power has thus been severely decreased, because its two 
assistant attorneys general cannot juggle three major hearings. The 
SLD also lacks the funds to hire the expert witnesses needed to rebut 
the testimony of the utilities' expert witnesses.185 For the present, the 
best that the SLD can do is to attempt to offset the massive invest-
ments of time and efforts by the utilities by pointing out the avail-
ability of alternative methods of calculating profit margins. The 
problem has been magnified recently, for the SLD now also repre-
sents the state's interest in proceedings before the Federal Power 
Commission and the Federal Energy Office. The division was given 
these new i-esponsibilities without a corresponding increase in staff 
and financial resources.1ss 
The Licensing and Regulation Division represents each indi-
County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Dec. 4, 1972) (attorney general secured temporary and perma-
nent injunctive relief against defendant's chain-referral marketing scheme). 
180. Coy Interview, supra note 22. See generally Comment, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1367, 
supra note 1. Cf. Comment, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1170,supra note 3. 
181. Coy Interview, supra note 22. Cf. Comment, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1367, supra 
note 1, at 1379-81. 
182. The total number of interventions through 1973 is 42. Coy Interview, supra 
note 22. 
183. See, e.g., Michigan Bell Tel. Co., No. U--4293 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., 
Dec. 21, 1973), where positions taken and supported solely by the attorney general's 
office were adopted by the Michigan Public Service Commission and resulted in a 
savings of 9,708,000 dollars to the public. 
184. Coy Interview, supra note 22. 
185. Coy Interview, supra note 22. 
186. Telephone Interview with Roderick S. Coy, Assistant Attorney General, Special 
Litigation Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 14, 
1974. 
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vidual licensing board's staff in proceedings for disciplinary action 
under the licensing statutes, for revocation of existing licenses, and 
for prevention of the unlicensed practice of a trade or profession. For 
example, the LRD currently has five cases pending in Detroit 
against building contractors.187 The division is seeking to enjoin the 
contractors from further business activities because the attorney gen-
eral's office has determined, as a result of consumer complaints, that 
they are abusing their licenses or operating their businesses without 
a license. The attorney general has also requested the courts to 
appoint a receiver to take over the assets of the contractors and to 
distribute them to those who have been defrauded. 
The LRD has several advantages over the CPD in protecting the 
public interest. First, many of the licensing statutes provide that the 
licensing agency, and consequently the LRD, has the power to com-
pel the attendance of witnesses at licensing proceedings.188 The CPD 
does not have the power to subpoena witnesses in its investiga-
tions.189 Second, the power to revoke a businessman's license is 
easier to exercise than the power to bring a quo warranto or public 
nuisance action. These advantages have led the attorney general's 
office to conclude that, whenever a businessman who is licensed by 
the state is engaged in unfair consumer practices, the LRD is the 
proper division to take action.190 
The attorney general's office is involved in other consumer pro-
tection programs. The other divisions presently handle consumer 
interest litigation when the agency they represent has an interest in 
the litigation,191 and the office publishes several pamphlets, in both 
English and Spanish, informing consumers of their rights under 
Michigan laws.192 In order to encourage local action against consumer 
187. Styka Interview, supra note 19. See, e.g., Kelley ex rel. Department of Licens-
ing &: Regulation v. White, No. 73-229-230 CZ (Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct., filed 
Feb. 12, 1973). 
188. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 338.557 (architects, professional engineers, 
and land surveyors), 338.502 (accountants) (1967). 
189. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. 
190. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
191. For example, the Commerce Division of the attorney general's office has rep-
resented the Department of Agriculture in controlling the quality of food in Michigan, 
See, e.g., City Smoked Fish Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 47 Mich. App. 125, 209 
N.W .2d 267 (1973), where the plaintiff challenged a department regulation requiring 
a higher salt content for packaged fish than was required by federal regulations. The 
court upheld the state regulation, but only to the extent that it regulated food proc-
essed for distribution within Michigan. However, in Armour &: Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 
76 (6th Cir. 1972), the attorney general and the Deparment of Agriculture failed in 
an attempt to protect Michigan's strict requirements for the marketing, labeling, pack-
aging, and ingredient contents in hot dogs and sausages. The court held that the 
Federal Whole Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-95 (1970), pre-empted the field and that the 
state regulations could not be enforced. 
192. See, e.g., "The Michigan Consumer Survival Manual" (Manual de Super• 
April 1974] Notes 1063. 
problems, the CPD has published a manual entitled "A Short Course 
on Consumer Protection Laws ,of Michigan,"193 which it has distrib-
uted to local prosecuting attorneys. The manual is designed to aid 
local authorities in the procedural an:d substantive problems of con-
sumer protection.194 Also, the CPD has issued guidelines, such as 
"Guidelines for the Advertisement of Gasoline Prices by Retail Gas-. 
oline Dealers in Michigan,"195 that give notice to businessmen that 
certain activities will be considered to· be unfair and deceptive and 
that the division will take action to force their discontinuance. The 
attorney general's ·office has also issued advisory opinions that help 
to establish interpretations of consumer protection statutes pending 
further interpretations by the courts. For example, the office has 
issued an opinion that interprets Michigan's home solicitation sales 
act196 in a manner that substantially broadens its scope.197 
vivencia del Consumidor de Michigan); "Seek Advice" (Consejo Busque); and "Take 
Time" (Tomese Su Tiempo). These pamphlets are distributed to libraries, schools, 
local community centers, and local consumer groups. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. 
193. Office of the Michigan Attorney General, A Short Course on Consumer Pro-
tection Laws of Michigan (rev. ed. 1973). 
194. This manual has proved useful to local prosecuting attorneys. Telephone 
Interview with John Knapp, Director, Washtenaw County Consumer Action Center, 
Washtenaw County Prosecuting Attorney's Office,' Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 11, 
1974; Telephone Interview with Paul G. Miller, Chief, Consumer Protection Division, 
Genesee County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Flint, Michigan, March _19, 1974. 
195. 
Guidelines for the Advertisement of Gasoline Prices by Retail Gasoline D«;alers 
in Michigan 
Pursuant to Michigan's deceptive advertising act, MCLA 445.801 et seq.; MSA 
19.853(1} et seq., a retail gasoline dealer's advertisement will be cited as false, 
misleading and deceptive if: · 
1) The price indicated on the roadside sign is not· the same J?rice as the price in-· 
dicated on the pump. · 
2) The decimal portion of the price, for example, the .9 in a 34.9 cent price, is 
not "at least one-half the height and width of the numerals representing the 
whole cents." MSA 12.1081(28b). . 
3) The pric~ of all grades of gasoline sold at the station are not advertised, or 
alternatively, if the price of only one or tlvo grades are advertised, the fact 
that one grade is a sub-regular grade is not clearly and conspicuously shown. 
4) The station advertises a "no stamp price" or "minimum service island" and 
the conditions for the special price (such as a certain island or pump) are not 
clear and conspicuous. . . • 
Clear and conspicuous, as stated above, shall mean lettering which is easily read-
able by a driver from his vehicle, given the speed limits, the number of lanes 
on the road, the relative congestion in the area, and the position of the station 
with respect to the roadway. 
During 1973, approximately 23 cease-and-desist orders were issued· for violations of 
these guidelines. All but one of the respondents agreed to halt their deceptive. ad-
vertising. That one is now being prosecuted. Bladen Telephone Interview, supra 
note l!i6. 
196. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§§ 445.111-.117 (Supp. 1973). 
197. Letter Opinion from Frank J. Kelley, Michigan Attorney General, to Senator 
Jack Faxon, Dec. 7, 1972. The opinion held, inter alia, that the three-day cancellation 
provisions of the Act apply to situations in which a seller initiates contact with a 
buyer by telephone or a buyer-cons~mer initiates contact with a seller ~nd then 
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B. Environmental Protection Activities 
Most of the attorney general's activities in the environmental area 
are centered in the Environmental Protection and Natural Resources 
Division (EPNRD), which has substantial statutory powers.108 These 
powers, along with the attorney general's common law powers, pro-
vide the basic framework for an effective environmental protection 
program. Again, the existence of adequate legal authority in the 
attorney general's office is of less value when the office lacks the 
resources needed to utilize that authority.199 As in the consumer area, 
the attorney general's office suffers from a lack of resources, but 
it still is providing a substantial amount of protection for the 
environment. 200 
The EPNRD's broadest power to protect the environment is 
derived from the Environmental Protection Act.201 An example of 
the division's recent activity under the Act is Kelley v. National 
Gypsum Company.202 The Air Pollution Control Commission issued 
an order setting forth a schedule for the reduction of particulate 
emissions from the kilns at defendant's cement factory.203 The order 
enters into a contract with that seller in the buyer's home. Id. at 3-6. This interpre• 
tation of the Act has been incorporated into the literature that is distributed by the 
division to the public. Bladen Telephone Interview, supra note 156. 
198. See text accompanying notes 93-145 supra. 
199. An example of the inability of the EPNRD to cope with a substantial portion 
of the state's environmental problems can be seen in the area of oil spills. There were 
approximately 186 oil spills affecting water in Michigan last year. Michigan Depart• 
ment of Natural Resources, Bureau of Water Management, Oil and Hazardous Ma• 
terials Control Section, Report to the Water Resources Commission on Oil Loss Con• 
trol Activities (1973). The attorney general's office, through the EPNRD, was able to 
take action on only two of these spills. The reason for its inability to deal with more 
of these spills is basically that the EPRND was unable to obtain the evidence (such 
as samples and photographs) needed to bring either civil or criminal actions. Inter• 
view with Stewart H. Freeman. Assistant Attorney General, Environmental Protection 
and Natural Resources Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michi• 
gan, Feb. 8, 1974. If the EPNRD had a sufficient number of investigators to gather 
the evidence, legal action could be taken to force compliance with strict precautionary 
standards. 
200. During the year 1973, the EPNRD received a total of 54 complaints from 
nonagency sources. There were 46 complaints from individual citizens, 5 from en• 
vironmental groups, and 3 from local government authorities. Action was taken on 
all of the complaints. The average time required to take initial action on the in-
dividual citizen complaints was ll.4 days. A complaint sent in anonymously by the 
Michigan Law Review received initial action in 9 days and was properly investigated. 
In addition, the EPNRD carried over approximately 50 active cases from 1972, while 
it initiated 17 new cases in 1973. 
201. MxcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1973). A study by Professor 
Joseph Sax of The University of Michigan shows that, through October I, 1973, the 
attorney general has been involved in nine cases on his own initiative under the 
Environmental Protection Act. Sax &: DiMento, supra note IOI, manuscript at A-88 
(appendix C). 
202. No. 1918 (Alpena County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Sept. 25, 1973). 
203. In re National Gypsum Co. (Air Pollution Control Commn., Feb. 16, 1971). 
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contemplated compliance by April 1977. By late 1972, the Commis-
sion staff was convinced that, while the defendant company had met 
the order's initial requirements, it would not meet its June 1974 
obligation. The case was then forwarded to the EPNRD. Since the 
Commission's order had not yet been violated, the EPNRD filed a 
complaint alleging violation of the Environmental Protection Act 
and, in the alternative, a public nuisance. Because "both parties 
hereto believe[ d] the interest of the public [ could] best be served by 
a settlement of this litigation without further proceedings,"204 they 
agreed to enter into a consent judgment. The defendant agreed to 
comply with a graduated emissions reduction schedule, under which 
the Commission's standards would be met by December 1976, three 
months earlier than originally scheduled. The court has retained the 
case until compliance with the standards is achieved. The division 
attained more than the desired result of compliance with Commis-
sion standards without expending the resources that litigation would 
require. 
The National Gypsum case is an example of the EPNRD's use of 
the common law power to abate public nuisances. The division's 
alternative ground for relief was that the air pollution emanating 
from the defendant's plant was of "such a density that it unreason-
ably interfere[ d] with the public health and welfare so as to be a 
public nuisance."205 
The EPNRD has also brought actions to recover for damages to 
the state's environment and natural resources. For example, in Peo-
ple ex rel. Kelley v. Amoco Production Co.,206 it brought an action 
alleging negligence by the defendants in the drilling of oil and gas 
wells in Grand Traverse county near Williamsburg, Michigan. In 
April 1973, gas blew out of one of the defendants' wells into subsur-
face permeable geological formations and created a "subsurface blow-
out well." This gas eventually rose to the surface, where it escaped 
into several streams in the area, damaging the state's natural resources. 
The damage alleged included a reduction in the fish population of 
the streams, pollution of the waters of the streams, and pollution of 
the beds of the streams.207 This type of effort to recover for damages 
to the state's resources should be part of every action brought to 
prevent pollution. 208 
204. No. 1918, stipulation at 2. 
205. No. 1918, complaint at 4. 
206. No. 3461 (Grand Traverse County, Mich., Cir. Ct., filed Aug. 17, 1973). This 
case has been removed by the defendants to the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Michigan, No. G-217-73CA7, removed Sept. IO, 1973. 
207. No. 3461, complaint at 5•6. The attorney general also sought recovery for 
damages to state highways and for the costs incurred by the various state agencies and 
departments during the emergency period. No. 3461, complaint at 4-5. 
208. The attorney general can also bring the action under his common law power 
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The EPNRD has also intervened in two major pollution cases 
involving the Great Lakes209 and has filed several amicus curiae 
briefs in litigation: outside of the state in order to support positions 
that would b~nefit Michigan's ·environmental program. One of the 
more important cases is Minnesota v. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency,210 which involves the issue of whether the federal 
executive branch may refuse to spend eleven billion dollars for waste 
treatment facilities d~spite a Congressional intent to authorize the 
expenditure and despite environmental necessity. Minnesota brought 
the action to force the Environmental Protection Agency to spend 
the allocated funds, and a district court ordered the expenditure. 
The EPNRD filed an amicus curiae brief in support of affirmance by 
the United States ·court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the 
agency's appeal from the district court decision.211 
The attorney general's office has also become involved in environ-
mental issues raised before the Public Service Commission. By inter-
vening in hearings, the attorney general is at present attempting to 
force the Commission to recognize that the Environmental Protec-
to recover for damage to the lands or property of the state or under the provisions of 
the Water Resources Commission Act or the Air Pollution Act if the pollution involves 
the violation of one of those uvo Acts. See text accompanying notes 140-41 supra. The 
attorney general would then be fulfilling both the goal of cessation of the pollution 
and that of restitution to the state. 
209. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., No. 5-72 Civ. 19 (D. Minn., Complaint 
o~ ,the State of Michigan, Intervening Plaintiff, filed March 10, 1972), where the plain-
tiffs are seeking to enjoin the defendant's pollution of Lake Superior by the dis-
charge of solid and liquid industrial wastes from its iron ore processing plant in Min• 
nesota. · 
The plaintiffs ,and the intervening Michigan Attorney General appear to have 
been successful in securing the abatement of the pollution. United States District 
Judge Miles Lord told the parties to the action that he will order the defendant to 
halt its discharges of taconite wastes containing dangerous asbestos fibers. The judge is 
now considering when to order the cut-off. Detroit Free Press, Feb. 27, 1974, at 1-A, 
col. 2 (metro ed.). In People ex rel. Scott v. City of Milwaukee, No. 72C-1253 (N.D. Ill.) 
(.Motion of the State 'of Michigan for leave to intervene as a party plaintiff, filed 
June 29, 1972); the, attorney general intervened, after remand from the United States 
Supreme Court, Dlinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), in an action to en-
join the defendant's pollution _of Lake Michigan. 
210. No. 73-1446 (8th Cir., docketed July 12, 1973). 
211. No. 73-1446 (Brief of the State of Michigan as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance, filed Sept. 14, 1973). This amicus curiae brief was adopted by the states 
of Arkansas, Dlinois, North Dakota, and Wisconsin, pursuant to rule 29 of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
EPNRD has recently filed another amicus curiae brief with the United States 
Supreme Court seeking reversal of the Colorado court of appeals decision in Western 
Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P .2d 907 (1973), which held that 
the state's pollution control agencies must secure a search warrant before entering 
a pusiness premise to investigate possible violation of pollution control laws. Western 
Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 73-690 (Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari). The writ of certiorari was granted, 42 U.S.L,W. 3422 
(U.S., Jan. 21, 1974). 
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tion Act imposes upon it a duty to consider eQ.vi.ronmental factors.212 
In In re Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.,213 the company petition_ed 
the Commission for authorization to establish a priority. system for 
the rationing of natural gas. Its proposed scheme placed the use of 
natural gas for the control of air pollution among the lowest prior-
ities. The attorney general intervened, urging that the use of gas for 
pollution control be given a higher priority.214 In opposition to the 
Commission's position that it had the authority to consider environ-
mental issues but was not required to do so, the attorney general 
maintained that the Environmental Protection Act imposed a duty 
on the Commission to consider environmental issues.215 The Com-
mission did not explicitly resolve this issue, but it did assign pollu-
tion control a higher priority in the proposed scheme. Subsequent 
cases before the Commission indicate that it has begun to consider 
environmental issues in making other decisions.216 The Commission 
has since asked the legislature for the authority to order public hear-
ings on the environmental effects of proposed electric power lip.es217 
and has requested a formal opinion by the attorney general· as to 
whether it already has the authority to order such a hearing.218 The 
212. The sources of that duty are the Michigan constitution, MICH. CoNST. art 4, 
§ 52, and sections 4 and 5 of the Environmental Protection Act. MICH. CoMP. LAws 
ANN. §§ 691.1204-.1205 (Supp. 1973). The constitutional provision places an obligation 
on the legislature, and derivatively on thG commissions created by the legislature, to 
protect the environment. The Environmental Protection · Act lends support to the 
argument that the commission has such a duty; section 4(2), MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. 
§ 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1973), grants the courts the authority to remit any action to an 
available administrative agency to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct. 
The court is to retain jurisdiction of the ~e "pending completion thereof for the 
purpose of determining whether adequate protection from pollution, impairment or 
destruction has been afforded." By requiring the courts t<;> ensure that the administra-
tive agencies have properly considered environmental issues, the legislature has im-
plicitly recognized an administrative duty to consider environmental factors. In sec-
tion 5(2) of the Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1205(2) (Supp. 1973), the admin-
istrative duty is made more explicit. The agency "shall" determine whether the alleged 
pollution is occurring and "shall" not authorize -0r approve ,:J,ny conduct which injures 
the environment so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative. · · · · 
213. No. U-3802 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., June 1, 1971). 
214. No. U-3802 (Notice of Intervention of Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, filM 
Jan. 11, 1971). The attorney general based his intervention on section 5 of the En-
vironmental Protection Act. M.ICH, _Co~P. LA.w~ _ANN. § 691.1205(1) (Supp. 1973). The 
Public Service Commission refused to recognize that the attorney general could inter-
vene as a matter of right but did allow the intervention. No. U-3802, transcript at 
16-29. . · ." · 
215. No. U-3802, transcript at 992. 
216. See Michigan Consol. Gas Co., No. U-3933, & Consumers Power Co.~ ·No. 
U-3935 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., Oct. 22, 1971) (Pipeline Construction Order), where 
the Commission, upon the attorney general's intervention, considered environmental 
factors in determining that the duplication of utility pipelines was unnecessary and 
reached a mutually acceptable compromise providing for consolidated pipelines that 
would reduce the threat of harm to the environment. -- , 
217. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 21, 1972, at 3=-A, col. 7 (metro ed.). 
218. Id: See texf accompanying notes 282-83 infra. 
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attorney general's initiative in this area is an excellent example of 
how he is using his power to intervene to influence the environ-
mental policies of the state. 
As in the case of consumer protection statutes, the attorney gen-
eral's office has issued advisory opinions interpreting pollution con-
trol statutes. For example, in 1970 he issued an opinion that held that 
the existing authority of local government units to adopt air pollu-
tion control ordinances was not pre-empted by the Air Pollution 
Act.219 The attorney general's office has also expressed its opinion on 
environmental issues through other means. For instance, it offered a 
position paper in a hearing before the Department of State Highways 
concerning the ecological advantages of creating a bicycle transporta-
tion network in Michigan.220 The attorney general has also presented 
a position paper before the Federal Trade Commission in support 
of proposed regulations requiring the disclosure in advertisements of 
the phosphorus content of cleaning agents.221 He has presented a 
position paper in support of proposed federal railroad and motor 
carrier noise emission standards before the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency.222 The purpose of these nonlitigation activities is 
to establish a solid statutory framework within which the office can 
provide for effective environmental protection. To the extent that 
environmental problems are solved by legislation, the workload of 
the attorney general's office and, consequently, the problem of 
insufficient funds are somewhat reduced.223 
III. PROPOSALS FOR .A. MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE 
The most efficient use of the attorney general's limited resources 
can be achieved if the state's public interest activities are centralized 
in his office. Because of his broad powers to enforce the laws and to 
influence the approval of new laws and the formulation of state 
policy, his office should coordinate activities in the protection of the 
public interest on a statewide basis. The National Association of 
Attorneys General (NAAG) recommends that each state's attorney 
general be given the primary responsibility for enforcing consumer 
219. [1969-70] MICH. A1TY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 197. 
220. Position Paper of the Attorney General of Michigan, The Development of a 
Bicycle Transportation Network in Michigan, March 27, 1973. 
221. Position Paper in Support of the Proposed Regulation submitted by the Attor• 
ney General of Michigan, The Proposed Regulation Concerning Detergent Labeling and 
Advertising, Jan. 2, 1973. 
222. ;Position Paper in Support of Noise Pollution Abatement submitted by the 
Attorney General of Michigan, Railroad Noise Emission Standards and Motor Carrier 
Noise Emission Standards, March 20, 1973 (Environmental Protection Agency Docket 
Nos. ONAC 7201001 and ONAC 7202002). 
223. Compare the situation in the consumer protection field discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 298-99 infra. 
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protection laws and for representing the public interest before s~te 
regulatory boards and that the attorney general be empowered to· file 
any action he deems necessary to protect the public interest.224 The 
trend in most states is toward a centralized structure in the attorney 
general's office to deal with these problems.225 The attitudes of cur-
rent and former state attorneys general indicate that a majority of 
them feel that their states' consumer protection activities should be 
primarily under the attorney general's jurisdiction,226 and in the 
recent past, most states, including Michigan, have created state con-
sumer protection and environmental protection sections within the 
attorney general's office.227 Of particular interest is the response of 
the Michigan attorney general to an NAAG questionnaire concern-
ing the centralization issue: 
The Attorney General is the only state officer with the neces-
sary authority to rapidly and effectively deal with consumer fraud 
problems. Only the Attorney General, as this state's chief law 
enforcement officer, presents an imminent threat of litigation to 
those who choose to engage in deceptive and fraudulent practices. 
Since an effective consumer protection program requires constant 
legal analysis of various problems and legal decisions regarding pos-
sible litigation, said program should clearly be under the direction 
of the state's chief law enforcement officer.228 
Even though Michigan has a structure conducive to centralized 
activity, the actual responsibility is shared between local prosecutors' 
offices and the attorney general's office.229 In addition, there is no 
centralized reporting system.23° Centralization would facilitate a 
coordinated attack on the state's problems and encourage the applica-
tion of the attorney general's expertise, resources, political power, 
224. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 8-9. 
225. For a compilation of state attorneys general with assistants regularly assigned 
to consumer protection activities, see OFFICE OF ATioRNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, 
at 417. For a compilation of offices with assistants assigned to environmental activities, 
see Environmental Control Questionnaires, supra note 148, at 3. See also Lovett, supra 
note 55, at 735. 
226. OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 395. The questionnaire re-
vealed that 31 out of 38 current (1970) attorneys general and 69 out of 108 former 
attorneys general felt that consumer protection activities should be centered in the 
attorney general's office. But see OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 29, 
where those same current (23 out of 38) and former (46 out of 70) attorneys general 
felt that their most important function was to represent the state's agencies, a function 
that could be inconsistent with representing the public. 
227. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRES, supra note 148, at 3; OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 416. Michigan's consumer protection division 
was established in 1960, while its environmental protection division was established 
in 1972. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
228. OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 415. 
229. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
230. See text accompanying notes 244-48 infra. 
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a,nd authority: The need for centralized activity is accentuated by 
the' difficulties involved in private efforts to provide protection,231 
the limitations on local authorities due to inadequate resources and 
their need t~ concentrate .on crimes involving physical violence,232 
and the apparent ineffectiveness of regulatory action by the state's 
administrative agencies.233 In addition, a centralized system will allow 
the state's environmental and consumer laws to be consistently 
applied; a program that does not give notice to persons contemplating 
· illegal activity that the state has a clear intent to pursue violators of 
. ~e law can never provide adequate protection for the public. A 
q~centralized program dissipates already limited resources, making 
·coordination difficult~ if not impossible, and inhibiting citizen access 
to the authorities empowered to deal with violations because of the 
231. Some of the difficulties involved in 'private litigation include the plaintiff's 
difficulty in proving that he has standing, whether individually or as a member of a 
plaintiff class; the .high costs and expenses involved in private actions in these areas; 
and the fact that, when "an individual does decide to exert a legal claim to environ• 
mental quality, he may find that he has taken on the legal and economic resources of 
an entire industry.''' Jackson, Symposium: Control of Environmental Hazards-Fore• 
word: 'Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68 Mrclt. L. REv, 1073, 
1076 (1970). See generally Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Consti-
tutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollu• 
tion Through Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126; Comment, Standing To 
Sue and Conservation Values, 38 CoLO. L. REv. 391 (1966); Note, State Consumer Pro• 
tection: A Proposal, 53 IowA L. REv. 710, 712-16 (1967); Comment, Equity and the 
Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1254, 1275-78 (1970); Note, 
Citizen Remedies in State Courts, 25 REs !PsA LoQUITUR 52 (1972). But see Mussehl, 
The Neighborhood· Consumer Center: Relief for the Consumer at Grass Roots Level, 
47 NoTRE DAME LAw. 1093, 1132 (1972) (private remedies should be favored since "no 
· effective restitution remedy exists within the sphere of governmental interests.'); 
Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 11: Considerations of Procedure, 49 Il,U, L. 
REv. 407, 479-80 (1969) (despite the traditional restrictive view of standing in class 
actions, Michigan courts may be in the midst of a liberalizing trend). See, e.g., Paley 
v. Coca Cola Co., 39 Mich. App. 379, 197 N.W.2d 478 (1972), where the court of appeals 
declined to follow a recent federal case, Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), and held 
that the plaintiffs could aggregate their individual damage claims in order to meet 
minimal jurisdiction amount requirements if the action could not othenvise be main-
tained in the circuit court 
232. W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 1, at 29-30; Saxbe, supra note 3, at 904. 
See also Detroit Free Press, Oct. 21, 1973, at 3-A, col. 5 (metro ed.), where it is reported 
that the Wayne County prosecutor's office has received 928 complaints of consumer 
fraud but _had started only six prosecutions. The reasons given for this inactivity 
include lack of resources, unfamiliarity with consumer laws, and fear of local merchants 
who might help defeat the local prosecutor at election time. The article also notes that 
consumer activities in outstate counties' prosecutors' offices are almost nonexistent. 
Local activity for the protection of the consumer does not seem to be likely in the 
n,ear future. In fact, the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office recently lost federal funds 
to operate its consumer fraud unit. The prosecutor failed to submit a plan that met 
'·the.federal requirements.for such programs. Specifically, he lost the 84,000-dollar grant 
because he had made no plans for the mediation of complaints and because his con• 
sumer education program was inadequate. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 4, 1973, at 3-A, 
col. l (metro ed.). 
233. See Detroit Free Press, Oct. 1, 1973, at 3-A, col. 2 (metro ed.) (discussing the 
ineffectiveness of the Michigan Consumers Council in its activities to protect the con-
sumer); Comment, 68 Mica. L. REv. 1254, supra note 231, at 1259. 
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confusing array of agencies.234 If public interest problems, especially 
in the consumer area, are dealt with only at the local level, the 
violators may simply move to another part of the state and continue 
their activities.230 Action by the attorney general would prevent the 
continuation of the activities anywhere within the state. Finally, 
centralization allows for easy compilation of reported violations and 
complaints. This compilation may enable the attorney general t~ 
recognize those problems that are of major concern and to warn the 
public of the violators' activities.236 
The attorney general also enjoys certain procedural advantages 
over both the private citizen and the local prosecutor. First, he has no 
problem in establishing his standing to sue since he is authorized to 
sue by statute if. the public interest is involved.237 The local prose-
cutor, in contrast, is limited to attacking problems that involve the 
interests of those citizens within his jurisdiction, not those that 
involve the interests of the citizens of the state as a whole. Second, 
the attorney general can utilize special venue statutes,238 which allow 
him to force the defendant to litigate at the state capital, in order to 
persuade the violator to agree to a consent judgment or voluntary 
assurance of discontinuance. 
A policy of centralization is not without its disadvantages. First, 
most of the factors discussed above are advantageous only to the 
extent that the problem under attack is statewide. A significant num-
ber of consumer and environmental problems are local in nature. 
If the attorney general had the sole responsibility to deal with local 
problems, many of the violations would, because of the need to allo-
cate limited resources, go unattended. Often these smaller violations 
most affect the daily life of the public. 
One resolution of the dilemma has been a system of concurrent 
activity, in which the attorney general and the local prosecutor 
divide the responsibility for public protection.239 The attorney gen-
eral has the authority to deal with any problem that he deems of 
sufficient statewide interest. The local prosecutor has the authority 
234. Comment, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 926, supra note 1, at 931-32. 
235. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1005, 1124 
(1967); Note, State Consumer Protection: A Proposal, 53 lowA L. R.Ev. 710, 718 (1967). 
236. Note, supra note 235, at 718. 
237. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 14.28, .101 (1967). See People v. O'Hara, 278 Mich. 
281, 294, 270 N.W. 298, 303 (1936); Attorney General ex rel. Seitz v. Board of Auditors, 
73 Mich. 53, 54-55, 40 N.W. 852, 852 (1888); Attorney General ex rel. Sheley v. City of 
Detroit, 55 Mich. 181, 183, 20 N.W. 894, 895-96 (1884); Attorney General ex rel. Cook 
v. City of Detroit, 26 Mich. 263, 266-67 (1872); Gremore v. Peoples Community Hosp. 
Authority, 8 Mich. App. 56, 59, 153 N.W.2d 377, 378 (1967). 
238. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 14.102 (1967); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1631 
(1968). See note 112 supra. 
239. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Customers into Effective 
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 395, 429-30 (1966). 
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to deal with all other problems within his jurisdiction. This concept 
is, to some degree, now contemplated by the Michigan statutes, which 
give the local prosecutor jurisdiction over his district or county while 
allowing the attorney general to initiate or intervene in any action.240 
Second, if centralization is carried out to too great an extent, the 
role that each local community's values play in the establishment and 
application of the law would be destroyed.241 The attorney general's 
implementation of an effective program of centralization should 
allow for locally variant values and conditions. The attorney general's 
office is trying to accommodate these considerations in the consumer 
protection area by encouraging the establishment of local consumer 
protection agencies and boards and by giving advice to local author-
ities on the prevention and effective prosecution of unfair consumer 
practices. 242 
Third, centralization could increase the attorney general's work-
load and decrease the substantive level of protection unless addi-
tional resources are made available to his office.243 Finally, the central-
ization of activity in Lansing might inhibit the ability to act quickly 
when necessary to preserve the assets of defrauded consumers from 
dissipation or to protect the public and the environment from the 
irreparable harm of continued pollution. While delay is probably 
inevitable in any centralized system, the attorney general can amelio-
rate the problem by deferring initially to the initiative of local 
prosecutors and then reviewing the reports from the prosecutors in 
order to select those cases in which he should participate. 
Currently, the Consumer Protection Division participates in a 
policy coordination council with twelve of the largest counties in 
Michigan.244 At the meetings of this council, the attorney general's 
representatives and the local prosecuting attorneys discuss their 
various problems, and the CPD gives the local prosecutors guidance. 
In addition, the attorney general maintains a close working relation-
ship with local prosecuting attorneys throughout the state and gives 
them as much help as possible.245 However, this is not the compre-
hensive coordination program that is needed. 
240. MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 14.28, .101 (1967). 
241. Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1080 (1955), where the 
author comments that "[t)he desire of a particular community to enforce the Jaws 
according to its needs should be respected if this will not be inimical to the interests 
of the state." 
242. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. But see Detroit Free Press, Oct. 21, 1973, at 
3-A, col. 5 (metro ed.), pointing out the ineffectiveness of local consumer activities, 
243. Comment, 68 MICH. L. REv. 926, supra note 1, at 971. 
244. Telephone Interview with Edwin M. Bladen, Assistant Attorney General, Con-
sumer Protection and Charitable Trusts Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, 
Lansing, Michigan, March 26, 1974. This council is established as a part of the federal 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration program, 
245. Id. 
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For a year and a half the attorney general operated a computer-
ized system of recording and catagorizing complaints from all law 
enforcement agencies in Wayne county.246 This system provided the 
CPD with a rapid compilation of the activities within the county 
and allowed it to determine when action by the office was war-
ranted.247 The program was discontinued when support from the 
federal government ended. The end of the system meant that the 
attorney general could no longer choose among the problems. 
One limitation on any reporting system is that it aids in dis-
covering problems only to the extent that local prosecutors discern 
the existence of those problems.248 Nonetheless, it is important that 
the state have the capability to become aware of and attack state-
wide problems. If sufficient resources could be found, a computer-
ized compilation system should be established for both consumer 
and environmental problems. 
Once the problems upon which the attorney general should 
concentrate have been defined, there are four major ways in which 
he should direct his activities in order to meet the twin goals of 
prevention and restitution. They are (1) litigation, (2) influencing 
state policy, (3) the promotion and support of better legislation, 
and (4) the promotion of educational programs designed to inform 
the public of its rights and of the channels available to seek redress 
of grievances. 
Perhaps the major area of the attorney general's activity should 
be litigation. This need not always require formal court action. 
Effective results can often be obtained by means of a phone call or 
a letter to the violator suggesting that the attorney general has in-
formation concerning a possible violation and that his office would 
like to see the problem corrected. There will, of course, be cases 
where an informal approach is inappropriate, either because the 
attorney general wants to establish solid legal precedent or set an 
example for other potential violators, or because the violator re-
fuses to comply. 
When informal methods are unsuccessful and formal litigation 
is required, the attorney general must decide whether he should 
resort to a criminal action, a civil action, or some combination of the 
two. A criminal prosecution has several advantages. First, the threat 
of prosecution gives the lower-level manager-for example, a local 
plant manager or a local franchisee-a persuasive argument with 
246. Id. The program ,vas supported by assistance from the Federal Trade Commi~-
sion in the form of computer time. 
247. Id. For example, the CPD determined, as a result of over 100 complaints against 
Time Incorporated, that it should bring an action to force the discontinuance of fraud-
ulent activities. See text accompanying notes 164-66 supra. 
248. For a way in which this problem can be ameliorated to some extent, see 
notes 304-08 infra and accompanying text. 
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which to convince his superiors that the funds necessary for com-
pliance with the law should be made available or th~t _the illegal 
activities should be halted.249 Second, the threat of cnmmal prose-
cution, especially if that threat is made real by the periodic prosecu-
tion of major offenders, can be an effective deterrent.2G0 
However, the in terrorem effects of criminal prosecutions may 
be difficult to achieve because of the problems involved in success• 
fully prosecuting alleged violators. For example, in order to support 
a criminal conviction for unfair consumer practices under the false 
advertising statute251 or the false pretenses statute,202 the attorney 
general must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
intended to deceive or defraud the consumer,253 that the consumer 
relied on the defendant's statements,254 and, in the case of false pre-
tenses, that the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of his 
statement and that the false pretense related to an existing fact and 
not to some future event.255 This heavy burden of proof makes the 
use of the criminal sanction both difficult and expensive. 
Civil remedies have several advantages over criminal remedies. 
Procedurally, civil remedies are more easily obtained by the attorney 
general: The burden of proof required in a civil action is less than 
that required in a criminal action since the attorney general need not 
provide each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; 
the pleadings in civil actions are usually simpler; and the scope of 
discovery is usually broader than it is in a criminal action. In a 
civil action, the attorney general can obtain a default judgment if 
249. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 388. 
250. An in terrorem effect will result from the use of criminal prosecutions only if 
those who are prosecuted under the statutes are actually forced to serve jail sentences, 
for a fine will often be treated as a cost of business and passed on to the public. The 
attorney general, in order to ensure that the criminal statutes do retain their in terrorem 
~ah~e, must be ":iJ!i!1g to punish those viola!o1;1 who continually and willfully engage 
m Improper activities. On the value of cr1mmal prosecutions, see generaUy Kove] 
A Case for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URBAN L, 153 (1969); W, MAO: 
NUSON &: J. CARPER, supra note I, at 16-17, 62; Saxbe, supra note 3, at 901-04; Develop-
ments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 235, at 1018, 1122·23; Comment 
The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Oflidals for Pollution of the Environment: 
37 ALBANY L. REv. 61 (1972); Comment, supra note 239, at 424-27. · 
251. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 750.33 (1968). 
252. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (1968) . 
. 253. People v. Austin, 3~1 Mich. 456, 460, 3 N.W.2d 841, 842 (1942) (intent to de• 
ceive); People v. Lee, 259 Mich. 355, 356, 243 N.W. 227, 228 (1932) (intent to defraud). 
254. People v. Lee, 259 Mich. 355,356,243 N.W. 227,228 (1932). 
255. People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88, 91, 81 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1957) (false pretense 
must relate to existing fact); ~eople v. Larco, 331 Mich. 420, 429, 49 N.W.2d 358, 363 
(1951) (~ctual knowledge of falsity by defendant). These strict requirements are still part 
of Michigan law. See People v. Sharpe, 22 Mich. App. 454, 178 N.W .2d 90 (1970). Another 
problem in false advertising cases is that the courts have held that not every misleading 
statement is actionable. The courts have made an allowance for the normal "puffing" 
of_ a product. See, e.g., People v. Austin, 301 Mich, 456, 460, 3 N.W.2d 841, 842 (1942) 
(dictum). 
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the defendant fails to appear, whereas he cannot try the defendant 
in absentia on a criminal charge. Finally, the attorney general is 
allowed to appeal from an adverse civil decision, while an appeal 
would not be allowed from an acquittal on a criminal charge.256 
A practical advantage of the civil suit is that the possibility of a 
favorable jury decision may be greater.Juries are not anxious to im-
pose the stigma of moral blame that accompanies criminal convic-
tion on a polluter or a person engaged in unfair consumer prac-
tices.257 
A final advantage to the civil approach is that restitutionary 
relief is more likely in such actions, for the attorney general can re-
quest a return to the status quo ante along with his request for in-
junctive relief. However, restitution could be made part of a crim-
inal sentence. For example, a suspended sentence could be made 
conditional on restitutionary relief. 
The problems inherent in the use of a criminal approach should 
not totally preclude its use. The attorney general should use a com-
bination of civil and criminal actions,258 but, because of the pro-
cedural advantages and the possibility of restitution, the civil suit 
should be favored. Criminal actions should be brought only to the 
extent necessary to support and maintain whatever in terrorem 
effect they may provide and, if necessary, to punish willful and con-
tinued violations. 
In addition to deciding how to proceed against an alleged vio-
lator, the attorney general must decide whether to go to court at all. 
There is no doubt that, like all prosecutorial officials, the attorney 
general has broad discretion to decide when and how to take action 
in the public interest.259 There are, ho~V'ever, some limits upon that 
discretion. He cannot base his decision upon an improper motive 
256. Kovel, supra note 250, at 156-58. 
257. Id. at 154-56. The author concludes that "(w]e may regret that the moral sense 
of the community is not sufficiently developed to consider pollution morally wrong, but 
until it is there is little sense" in pursuing criminal remedies. Id. at 155. 
258. Id. at 170-71. 
259. Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 450, 185 N.W. 877, 880 (1921); Attorney 
General ex rel. Linnell v. Gay, 162 Mich. 612, 616, 127 N.W. 814, 816 (1910); Ex rel. 
Coon v. Attorney General, 42 Mich. 65, 3 N.W. 258 (1879); People ex rel. Yates v. Attor-
ney General, 41 Mich. 728, 729, 3 N.W. 205, 206 (1879); Gremore v. Peoples Community 
Hosp. Authority, 8 Mich. App. 56, 59, 153 N.W.2d 377, 378 (1967). For general discus-
sions of prosecutorial discretion, see F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE 
A SusPEcr WITH A Cruz,.m (1970); Dickens, The Attorney-General's Consent to Proser.u-
tions, 35 Mon. L. REv. 347, 357 (1972) C'[a]n undoubted area of the Attorney-General's 
unreviewable discretion is in civil relator actions by which he may act at the relation of 
any person on behalf of the Crown as parens patriae to enforce the law for the general 
public benefit.''); Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective 
Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. !LL. L.F. 88; Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174 (1965); Note, Judicial Control of the Deci-
sion To Prose~ute, ~4 FACULTY OF LAw REvmw 133 (1966) (University of Toronto); Note, 
Prosecutor's D,scretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1955). _ 
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such as discrimination on the basis of race or religion.200 In inter-
vention situations, his discretion is limited by the parties' right to a 
prompt disposition of their controversy and the court's power to con-
trol the proceedings before it in an orderly fashion.261 Beyond these 
minimal limitations, which only provide for the review of affirma-
tive action undertaken by the attorney general and provide no 
method of reviewing an attorney general's decision not to take 
action, his discretion is unlimited. Mandamus will not lie, because 
his prosecutorial duty is not ministerial.262 The courts have recited 
a general rule that the attorney general's discretion is subject to 
judicial review if it is "clearly inimical" to the public interest,263 but, 
as a practical matter, there is no real supervision. This will be im-
portant when no action is taken on a complaint brought by a citizen 
to the attorney general's office. Beyond political pressure, the deci-
sion not to act is not reviewable. 264 
The existence of this broad discretionary power presents the 
issue of whether effective protection of the public interest might not 
be better served if the attorney general were to establish a set of 
guidelines on when action should be taken. On the national level 
the American Bar Association has attempted to establish guidelines 
for criminal prosecutions, in order to facilitate and, to some extent, 
control prosecutorial discretion.265 The Michigan attorney general 
260. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. 
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Il8 U.S. 356 (1886); United 
States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1149, I151 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 
256, 263-64, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2ll, 215-16 (1967). See also United States v. Falk, 479 F,2d 
616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973), where the court said that discriminatory prosecution "on the 
basis of the exercise of protected First Amendment activities" is forbidden "just as dis-
crimination on the basis of religion or race is forbidden by the Constitution." 
261. Gremore v. Peoples Community Hosp. Authority, 8 Mich. App. 56, 59, 153 
N.W.2d 377, 378 (1967). On the issue of the court's power to control the proceedings 
before it, see Hain v. Newell, 223 Mich. 20, 27-28, 193 N.W. 839, 842 (1923): "All courts 
of general jurisdiction have inherent power to make and protect relevant interlocutory 
orders and to do all incidental things which seem reasonably necessary for the adminis-
tration of justice and efficient exercise of their functions within the scope of their juris-
diction." 
262. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text. 
263. People v. Johnston, 326 Mich. 213,217, 40 N.W.2d 124, 126 (1949). 
264. Attorney General ex rel. Linnell v. Gay, 162 Mich. 612, 616, 127 N.W. 814, 816 
(1910): "We do not mean to imply that there is any obligation upon the attorney gen-
eral under this action to file an information when, in his judgment, there are proper 
reasons of policy for not doing it, or any obstacle to a refusal to do so when solicited 
by private persons in the furtherance of their own interests, provided State interests do 
not require it." But see Lamoreaux v. Attorney General, 89 Mich. 146, 150-51, 50 N.W. 
812, 813 (1891), where the court said that it would review the refusal of the attorney 
general to institute a quo warranto action against a city sheriff because it feared that, 
where the attorney general and the sheriff were of the same political party, the attorney 
general's refusal may be based on improper motives. 
265. See, e.g., ABA PROJEcr ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING 
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNcrION AND THE DEFENSE FUNcrION standards 3.8-3.9 (1971) [here-
inafter ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA also recommends that each "prosecutor's office should 
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has no such formal guidelines in the consumer and environmental 
areas.266 Guidelines would assure that resources were directed to-
ward the problems that most need attention. A set of guidelines, 
however, can be no more than just that. The facts of each situation 
vary to such an extent that any set of guidelines should allow for 
flexibility of action; their ultimate value lies in their use as recom-
mendations. 
Several basic factors should go into any decision of when to take 
action. The attorney general must first decide if the violation is of 
such a nature as to warrant action by any prosecutorial officer and 
then decide if the violation warrants action by his office in particu-
lar. Recommended considerations include the nature, extent, and 
scope of the harm caused, the financial situation of the affected citi-
zen, the possibility of successful litigation, speed of disposition, the 
degree of willfulness involved, the importance of the case in the 
attorney general's general scheme to provide statewide consumer or 
environmental protection, and the relative importance of a success-
ful resolution of this particular case in comparison to the actions 
that will not be handled if resources are allocated to it. The attorney 
general should give no weight to personal or political advantages 
that might be involved in a particular case,267 but it is inevitable 
that such considerations will occasionally be a factor.268 To the ex-
tent that a decision is immune from such considerations, however, 
the establishment of guidelines will help the office fulfill its obliga-
tion to protect the public interest. 
In addition to the lack of prelitigation guidelines, the Michigan 
attorney general has no system of periodic checks to determine 
whether the requirements of voluntary agreements or judicial judg-
ments are being complied with.269 Particularly when voluntary 
develop a statement of (i) general policies to guide the exercise of prosccutorial discre-
tion and (ii) procedures of the office.'' Id., standard 2.5. Cf. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
A'ITORNEYS GENERAL, MODEL MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR A'ITORNEYS GEN-
ERALS' OFFICES (1972). Twelve states' attorney general's offices have or arc preparing pro-
cedures manuals in the area of consumer protection. State Programs, supra note 148, at 
32-33. 
266. Telephone interview -with Ronald J. Styka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, 
Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 12, 1974. 
267. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 265, standard 3.9(c). 
268. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 235, at 1133 
("[T]he strong political aura which inevitably surrounds an elected attorney general 
encourages an overemphasis on consumer refunds and may occasionally discourage 
action against the questionable practices of 'respectable' businessmen.''); Comment, 
Public and Private Consumer Remedies in New York, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 326,329 (1970). 
However, "[p]olitical sensitivity can work both ways •.• and the consumer's complaint 
might have some publicity value." Mussehl, supra note 231, at 1132. See also Comment, 
70 MICH. L. REv. 1367, supra note I, at 1374 n.44. 
269. Bladen Telephone Interview, supra note 156; Telephone Interview with Stewart 
H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental Protection and Natural Re-
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methods are used, the'attorney general must carefully check for com-
pliance: Without such a system, the tool of voluntary agreement is 
ineffective. There is no such system because there are not enough 
resources tp provide for even the initial enforcement of the law, 
much less for follow-up enforcement.270 In the environmental area, 
part of the responsibility for such a program can be placed on the 
administrative agencies, but the EPNRD must persuade the agen-
cies to allocate a sufficient amount of their resources to fund the 
compliance program. Whether by securing more funds from the 
legislature or by convincing the agencies to establish compliance 
programs, the attorney general must ensure that an effective system 
is established. 
The second method used by the attorney general should be the 
exercise of influence on the formulation of state policy. The recog-
nition that the attorney general is more than just the governor's 
attorney suggests that he should have, and does have, a role to play 
in state policy formulation.271 Because there may be doubt under 
some of .the statutes establishing administrative agencies as to 
whether the attorney general must wait for agency referral before 
he can act, he must ensure that the state's policies are such that he 
need not always exercise initiative power. There are several ways in 
which the attorney general can seek to establish administrative pol-
icies that, in ~emselves, properly protect the public interest. 
First, he cah influence the policies of state agencies by issuing 
advisory opinions.272 The attorney general currently issues three 
types of advisory opinions: informal opinions to agency and depart-
merit heads, letter opinions, and formal opinions.273 While many 
sources Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 13, 1974 
(hereinafter Freeman Telephone Interview]. 
270. Id. 
271. See B. ABERNETHY, SO!\IE PERSISTING QUESTIONS CONCERNING TIIE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STATE ExEcunVE 38 (1960), where the author, in commenting upon the results of a ques• 
tionnaire sent to governors and attorneys general c:;oncerning the position of the attorney 
general in state government, concludes that 
[a] thin and not too easily defined thread of thought runs through all their com• 
ments, which seems to say that this is not solely a ministerial post; that its rcsponsi• 
bilities go beyond and embrace something of the judicial and perhaps even of the 
representative; that the attorney general is not solely the governor's attorney, or 
even sol[e]ly his administration's attorney, but is rather the people's and the state's 
attorney, responsible to maintain and protect the interests and rights of the people 
and of the state as against the governor and his administration, as well as to serve 
state officials ••• and that here is an institution about which hangs an aura of the 
ancient and of the common law, as well as constitutional statutory law, which marks 
it for special status and stature in the state governmental structure. 
But cf. note 226 supra. 
272. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 14.32 (1967). See generally Larson, The Importance 
and Value of Attorney General Opinions, 41 IowA L. REv. 351 (1956); Scott, The Role 
of the Attorney General's Opinions in Illinois, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 643 (1972); To~pfer, 
Some Legal Aspects of the Duty of the Attorney General To Advise, 19 U. CIN, L. REV. 
201 (1950). . 
273. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
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jurisdictions hold that formal opinions are not binding on state 
agencies,274 in Michigan formal advisory opinions, while not bind-
ing on the courts,275 do bind state agencies.276 
Even if the Michigan courts were to hold that no opinions are 
binding on state agencies, an opinion by the attorney general would, 
in all probability, still be followed.277 The agency's desire to do 
what the law requires motivates its request for the opinion, and a 
well-reasoned and well-researched opinion will most likely be fol-
lowed.278 Also, the agencies wish to be protected. by the attorney 
general's opinion. While this.protection is debatable from a legal 
point of view,279 action supported by an opinion will at least be 
likely to protect the agency from public criticism. Moreover, the 
agency will probably follow the opinion simply because it is the 
agency's only source of legal advice. Finally, state officials may fol-
low the attorney general's opinion because they feel that the state 
courts will consider the opinion to be highly persuasive authority.280 
The Michigan attorney general's issuance of advisory opinions has 
been limited in the recent past, but efforts are currently being made 
to increase activity in this respect.281 
The present system has one major defect. The time delay be-
tween the request for an opinion and its issuance is, in ·some cases, 
unreasonably long. For example, in 1972, the Michigan Public Ser-
vice Commission requested an opinion as to whether it had the 
authority to order public hearings on the environmental effects of 
proposed electric power lines.282 The opinion has_ not yet been is-
274. Christenson, supra note 3, at 326; Larson, supra note 272, at 360-61. 
275. Fowler v. Kavanagh, 63 F. Supp. 167, 168-69 (E.D. Mich. 1944), revd. on other 
grounds, 146 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1945); David Walcott Kendall Memorial School v. City 
of Grand Rapids, 11 Mich. App. 231,237, 160 N.W.2d 778,781 (1968). 
276. Traverse City School Dist. v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 410 n.2, 185 
N.W.2d 9, 17 n.2 (1971). See also [1950-1952] MICH. ATIY. GEN. BmNNIAL REP. 54, 55. 
277. Abraham &: Benedetti, The State Attorney General: A Friend of the Court?, 
117 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 799-800 (1969); Christenson, supra note 3, at 326-27; Larson, 
supra note 272, at 361; Scott, supra note 272, at 653. 
278. Christenson, supra note 3, at 326. 
279. Christenson, supra note 3, at 327; Larson, supra note 272, at 363; Toepfer, 
supra note 272, at 216-17. If a state official follows an attorney general's opinion, he will 
most likely have a good faith defense to any action brought against him. See State ex rel. 
Smith v. Leonard, 192 Ark. 834, 839-40, 95 S.W.2d 86, 88-89 (1936); State ex rel. Johnson 
v. Baker, 74 N.D. 244,277, 21 N.W.2d 355,372 (1~4~). 
280. David Walcott Kendall Memorial Schopl-v. City of Grand Rapids, 11 Mich. App. 
231,237, 160 N.W.2d 778, 781 (1968). See also Fowler v. Kavanagh, 63 F. Supp. 167, 168-
69 (E.D. Mich. 1944), revd. an other grounds, 146 F,2d 961 (6th Cir. 1945). 
281. Styka Interview, supra note 19. For example, in 1973, the Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the EPNRD estimated that his division issued 6 formal opinions 
and 160 letter opinions. During a one-week sample period, his division handled 96 
informal opinions. Freeman Telephone Interview, supra note 269. 
282. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 21, 1972, at 3-A, col. 7 (metro ed.). See text accompany-
ing note 218 supra. 
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sued. The opinion request received a quick response at the division 
level, but its controversial nature led to its delay by the five-man 
board that reviews all proposed formal opinions.283 While the attor-
ney general must ensure that each formal opinion is correct with 
respect to both law and policy, some care must also be taken to 
ensure that the process of review does not destroy whatever value a 
proper opinion may have. The attorney general should see that 
opinion requests proceed expeditiously through his office and that 
the opinions are issued while they will still be of use to the agency 
that requested them. The establishment of formal time limits on 
each step of the issuing process might be helpful. 
A program of advisory opinions aimed at ensuring that the pol-
icies of the state's administrative agencies are consonant with the pro-
tection of the public interest might be challenged on the ground 
that it constitutes unwarranted interference with the agencies' legis-
lative mandate to deal with consumer and environmental problems. 
While excessive use of opinions might be justifiably criticized on 
this ground, the reasonable exercise of the opinion power can with-
stand such a challenge. The attorney general has also been given 
a legislative mandate to provide for consumer and environmental 
protection. It is within his authority to use all his powers to see that 
such protection is provided. 
There is one limiting factor on the opinion power of the attor-
ney general. He may issue an advisory opinion only upon a request 
from the governor, the legislature, or any state officer.284 While this 
statutory requirement may theoretically limit his power, the pros-
pects of securing a request for an opinion on a particular issue are 
probably good.285 If the attorney general can secure the necessary 
request, his advisory opinion power is an effective way through 
which to influence and help formulate state policy. 
A second method that the attorney general can employ to in-
fluence state policy at the administrative level is given to him by the 
Michigan Administrative Procedures Act.286 Section 45287 of the Act 
provides that the approval and adoption of any agency rule or stan-
dard is conditioned upon the attorney general's determination that 
it is legal. His determination under this section need not stop 
at the point where he decides that the proposed regulations are not 
unconstitutional or in conflict with a statute, as it presently does.288 
283. Interview with Roderick S. Coy, Assistant Attorney General, Special Litigation 
Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, Feb. 8, 1974. 
284. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 14.32 (1967). 
285. Freeman Telephone Interview, supra note 269. 
286. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 24.201-.315 (Supp. 1973). 
287. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 24.245(1) (Supp. 1973). 
288. Freeman Telephone Interview, supra note 269. In some instances, it may be 
impractical for the attorney general's office to give substantive review to policy consid• 
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The attorney general has the right to require that the proposed reg-
ulations be in accordance with the legislature's desire to provide for 
consumer and environmental protection. The effectiveness of this 
power, however, is dependent on the initial adoption of rules by the 
agencies since the attorney general can only comment on proposed 
regulations. 
If the attempts of the attorney general to influence state policies 
by using advisory opinions or through the review of proposed regu-
lations do not succeed, he can still influence agency policies by re-
fusing to represent the agencies in particular litigation, because he 
is their exclusive legal representative.289 While the office has not 
done this recently,290 it could in the future refuse to initiate an ac-
tion requested by the agency or refuse to defend the agency in an 
action brought against it. 
This approach can be criticized as a violation of the duty, im-
posed upon the attorney general by the legislature, to represent 
state agencies.291 It can be argued that, if the attorney general is to 
maintain the position that he has the exclusive power to represent 
state agencies, he must provide that representation at all times. The 
legislature may not have intended to give the attorney general such 
power over state agencies. He has, however, been given clear in-
structions to protect the public interest in consumer and environ-
mental areas. It can be inferred from this that he should utilize all 
powers available to protect the public interest and that one of these 
powers is to decide whether his representation of an agency would be 
detrimental to the public interest. There is some support for this 
principle at the federal level.292 In addition, the American Bar Asso-
ciation Code of Professional Responsibility provides that an attor-
ney may "exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to 
assert a right or position of his client."293 If the attorney general 
erations in a proposed rule or standard. For example, when a regulation concerning 
the amount of pollutants that should be allowed to be discharged is involved, it may be 
difficult for the EPNRD to challenge the agency's decision since the agency will have 
conducted hearings on the matter. -
289. Styka Interview, supra note 19; Christenson, supra note 3, at 311-15. 
290. Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
291. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 14.29 (1967). 
292. H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 510 (1937), quoting FTC v. 
Claire Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174 (1927): 
The Attorney General and the officers of the Department of Justice are charged 
with no such simple duty as requires merely interpretation, prosecution, or defense 
at the behest of public administrators. In the words of the Supreme Court, they 
have the duty-not merely the power-of examining the "scope and propriety" of 
administrative action and of "sifting out" that which is pertinent and lawful before 
asking the courts to adjudge. Moreover, says the nation's highest tribunal, the wide 
scope and variety of these questions "show the wisdom of requiring the chief law 
officer of the Government to exercise a sound discretion." 
See also Christenson, supra note 3, at 314. 
293. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R.EsPONSIBUITY DR 7-IOl(B)(l) (1970). These dis-
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determines that the public interest would be harmed, he has not 
only the right but the duty to refuse to handle the case.204 
A third area of attorney general activity should be the initiation 
and promotion of legislation: The most obvious need for effort in 
this regard is in the support of legislation that would increase the 
resources available to the attorney general's office. The office can-
not now seek out cases because of the shortage of personnel2M and 
must, on occasion, fail to take action on problems of which it is 
aware.296 As one of the agencies charged with the enforcement of the 
law, the attorney general's office should accept some of the respon-
sibility for securing appropriate funds for itself and for other 
agencies.297 
ciplinary rules were adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in 1971. 885 Mich, lvi 
(1971). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsl'ONSIBILITY DR 7-10l(B)(2) (1970) 
(A lawyer may "[r]efuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful, 
even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal.'): 
Christenson, supra note 3, at 818-14. 
294. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE.sPoNSIBlllTY EC 7-14 (1970): "A government 
lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain from instituting 
or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair.'' An interesting question arises as to 
whether the attorney general should authorize the state agency to secure outside counsel 
to handle the case. While this would lessen the impact of his refusal to represent the 
agency, the attorney general should allow the agency to secure the outside counsel for 
the purposes of the one case and then intervene on the other side to oppose the agency's 
position. See ABA CODE OF PRoFESSioNL REsPoNSmILITY DR 2-110(A)(2) (1970): "[A] law-
yer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid 
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, 
allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and 
property to which the client is entitled ••• .'' 
295. Bladen Interview, supra note 154; Freeman Interview, supra note 199. 
296. See note 199 supra. 
297. The attorney general's efforts to secure additional funds has met with little 
success in the past. For example, the following table shows the results of his efforts to 
obtain more assistant attorneys general: 
NONCLERICAL POSITIONS 
Consumer, Licensing 8: Environmental 
Protection• Regulation Protection 
Total New Total New Total New 
1972-78 
Requested 8 2 6 2 14 8 
Governor Recommended 6 0 5 1 8 2 
Final Appropriation 6 0 5 1 9 3 
1978-74 
Requested 6 2 .. 7 2 12 3 
Governor Recommended 6 0 5 0 9 0 
Final Appropriation 6 0 ,6 1 9 0 
1974-75 
Requested 10 4 II 5••· 9 0 
Governor Recommended 6 0 6 0 9 0 
•Includes both attorney and investigator positions . 
.. Supplemental request made on March 6, 1978, after initial Budget Request. 
•• •Includes 3 attorneys to act as drug diversion task force. 
Letter from Ronald J. Styka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Michigan Attorney 
General's Office, to Michigan Law Review, March 27, 1974. 
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The attorney general should also initiate and support particular 
pieces of legislation that would provide better substantive law in the 
consumer protection area, where the attorney general's activities are 
now limited because of the lack of a comprehensive consumer pro-
tection act. While the office has been supporting the passage of such 
a bill for the past several years,298 the political climate in the legisla-
ture, among other things, has prevented its passage.299 Because of the 
limited resources available to the attorney general, his present activ-
ities are episodic in nature. No comprehensive attack on consumer 
and environmental problems can be sustained without the proper 
legislative support. Thus, the legislature and the public are more to 
blame than the attorney general. In any case, the attorney general 
should allocate a portion of the resources available to him toward 
securing the approval of needed funds and legislation. In the imme-
diate future a substantial investment of resources into a program 
of legislative lobbying, even to the point of employing a lobbyist, 
could result in the establishment of a solid foundation for effective 
consumer and environmental protection. 
The final area of activity for the attorney general should be ed-
ucation;300 no program of consumer or environmental protection 
can be effective without an aware public.301 Through education, 
the attorney general can provide for the protection of the public 
interest in the most efficient way possible. 
An educated public will help the attorney general's program of 
protection in other ways. In a law enforcement system that, because 
of its limited resources, must rely upon public complaints, the pub-
lic must have the capacity both to recognize problems and to report 
those problems to the proper law enforcement. agency. Therefore, 
the education programs must be aimed not only at informing the 
public of its rights but also at informing it of how it should seek 
redress of violations of those rights.302 
298. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. The attorney general's office did play a 
major role in the initiation and passage of the Land Sales Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 565.801-.835 (Supp. 1973), and the Home Sales Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 445.111-.117 (Supp. 1973). Styka Interview, supra note 19. 
299. The Michigan House of Representatives passed a new act to protect consumers, 
Mich. H.B. 4001, by a 71 to 35 margin. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 31, 1974, at 3-A, col. 6 
(3-star ed.). However, the bill faces an uncertain fate in the Michigan Senate. See 
Detroit Free Press, Feb. 2, 1974, at 3-A, col. 4 (metro ed.) (description of successful 
efforts by the Senate Republicans to assign the bill to the conservative Senate Judiciary 
Committee, which killed such a bill two years ago). 
300. For discussion of the role education should play in an attorney general's pro-
gram, see OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 421-22; Burch, supra note 3, 
at 163-64; O'Connell, supra note 3, at 236-37; Saxbe, supra note 3, at 906-08. 
301. See Note, supra note 49, at 1479, which showed that the level of public knowl-
edge of consumer law is low: "Few, if any, of the factors studied-general education 
level, income, newspaper readership, consumer experience--had a strong correlation 
with knowledge of consumer rights."' 
302. A survey of public interest groups, which should be among the best informed 
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An education program may help the protection effort in two 
other ways. First, if the public has an increased awareness and knowl-
edge of consumer and environmental problems, it will be more 
likely to pressure the legislature to approve the proper substantive 
legislation and to allocate the necessary funds. Second, increased 
knowledge and awareness of problems may result in increased pri-
vate litigation, which may in turn lead to an increased receptivity 
on the part of courts to environmental and consumer problems. 303 
In addition, private litigation of these problems would decrease tl1e 
workload of the attorney general's office, again allowing it to reallo-
cate some of its resources to other activities. As previously men-
tioned, the Michigan attorney general's office is involved in some 
public education programs. These programs are sound as far as they 
go, but more are needed. The attorney general should develop a full 
program under the supervision of a consumer education specialist. 
Perhaps the two most promising avenues are public relations work 
in the media and intensive programs for school children. 
Activities in the four areas discussed above-litigation, policy 
making, legislation, and education-should result in an effective 
program of consumer and environmental protection. One final sug-
gestion encompasses all four areas. The attorney general's office 
should, to the greatest extent possible given its limited resources, 
shift from its present reliance on citizen complaints and agency 
referrals to a program involving affirmative action by the attorney 
general. Reliance on citizen complaints is an effective method of 
dealing with the problems only to the extent that the complaints re-
ceived by the office represent a comprehensive cross section of the 
problems within the state.304 Lower-income persons are distrustful 
of the law to the point that they are reluctant to rely on the law and 
its officials to seek redress of their rights: 305 "The poor cannot 
groups of citizens, indicates that more than half of those groups responding do not rely 
upon the attorney general's office. The response letters are on file with the Michigan 
Law Review. 
303. For an example of a judicial response to a need of the public to secure relief, 
see Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 980 (1957), where the author describes the history of equity's recognition of a 
need for derivative suits and tl1e subsequent evolution of mechanisms to allow them. 
The author concluded "that the origin of tlie derivative suit, as indeed of any non-
statutory type of action, lies in judicial recognition of a new wrong or maladjustment 
for which pre-existing legal procedure proved more or less inadequate." Id. at 992, 
304. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 235, at 1126, A 
system that basically relies on consumer complaints requires a knowledgeable public 
tliat is willing to report violations of tlie law. However, a recent study has shown, 
"tlie level of citizen knowledge of criminal law is fairly high and tliat of consumer 
law is fairly low." Note, supra note 49, at 1479. With this low level of citizen knowl• 
edge of consumer law, the Michigan attorney general cannot expect real results unless 
a massive increase in public knowledge is brought about tlirough public education 
programs or unless tlie office shifts to an initiative approach. 
305. W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note l, at 8-9, 54. The reasons for this re• 
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conceive of getting justice from a law which has so viciously ex-
ploited them in the past."306 However, it is often these lower-income 
persons who bear the brunt of harmful activities, especially unfair 
and deceptive consumer practices. The attorney general should es-
tablish a monitoring system that reviews possible areas of violations, 
such as media advertisements.307 
luctance to rely upon governmental officials can be seen in the remarks of former 
United States Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. In a speech before the National 
Conference of Law and Poverty in 1965, Mr. Katzenbach commented: 
More damaging, poverty breeds crime indirectly, because it breeds isolation 
from society and fundamental resentment against its laws and those who enforce 
them ...• 
Too often, the poor man sees the law only as something that garnishees his 
salary; that repossesses his refrigerator; that evicts him from his house; that can-
cels his welfare; that binds him to usury; or that deprives him of his liberty be-
cause he cannot afford bail .... 
. . . The poor man has little reason really to believe [the law] is his guardian; 
he has every reason to believe it is an instrument of the other society, of the 
well-off, the well-educated, the well-dressed, and the well-connected. The poor man 
is cut off from this society-and from the protection of its laws .... 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW & POVERTY, PROCEEDINGS 63 (1965). As noted, the recent 
study of Michigan citizens' legal knowledge did not show any positive correlation 
between education and consumer knowledge, Note, supra note 49, at 1471, or between 
higher incomes and consumer knowledge. Note, supra, at 1472. If these conclusions are 
valid, the problems inherent in a system that relies on complaints will probably arise 
throughout the state but will be most severe in the lower-income areas where the 
public shows less willingness to report illegal activities to law enforcement agencies. 
One possible method of increasing the representativeness of the complaints that 
reach the attorney general's office is to establish "field offices" throughout the state, 
especially in Detroit. These offices would encourage complaints in areas that normally 
do not report complaints by providing easily accessible opportunities to report. The 
Complaint Examiner in the Michigan Attorney General's office favors the establish-
ment of such field offices in order to provide the inner-city citizen with an opportunity 
to complain and receive help. She estimates that only about 15 per cent of the con-
sumer complaints received by the attorney general's office are from the City of Detroit. 
Wright Interview, supra note 155. See Burch, supra note 3, at 162 (describing Mary-
land's "storefront office" program). But see Saxbe, supra note 3, at 898 (establishment 
of field offices may cause a separation of already limited resources available to an at-
torney general's office and lead to concentration on local problems while concern 
with long-range problems is diminished). 
The problem of shortages of funds can be partially offset by using federal funds 
that are available for the operation of local offices. For example, the Missouri Attorney 
General operates a federally funded consumer protection office in St. Louis. Letter 
from Harvey Tettlebaum, Chief Counsel, Consumer Protection Division, Missouri 
Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, Missouri, to the Michigan Law Review, Sept. 
20, 1973. Other states operating branch consumer protection offices include Alabama 
(I), Alaska (3), Arizona (1), California (14), Florida (3), Idaho (2), Illinois (20), Indiana 
(1), Louisiana (3), Maryland (2), Missouri (3), New Jersey (I), New York (7), Penn-
sylvania (7), Texas (5), and Wisconsin (2). State Programs, supra note 148, at 6-7. The 
risk of overconcentration on local problems can be overcome by a system of tracing 
and recording complaints in order to discern statewide problems. See generally Note, 
Consumer Protection by the State Attorney General: A Time for Renewal, 49 NoTRE 
DAME LAW. 410, 423-27 (1973). 
306. w. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 1, at 54. 
307. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 105-36; w. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note l; 
Comment, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 926, supra note I, at 926-27. 
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Reliance on agency referrals is likewise effective only to the ex-
tent that the agencies themselves receive complaints about a com• 
prehensive cross section of the problems within the state, the agen-
cies are adequately staffed and budgeted, and the agencies remain im~ 
mune from political pressures. In order to discern the problems af-
fecting less vocal groups, the attorney general must inform himself 
of the activities occurring in, for example, the inner city in Detroit. 
This can be done by establishing field offices.808 The establishment 
of an affirmative program would allow the attorney general to pro-
vide more effectively for consumer and environmental protection 
throughout the state. 
IV. FINDINGS AND R.EcoMMENDATJONS 
The Michigan attorney general's office is taking an active role 
in both the consumer and environmental protection areas, and in 
many ways the office should be a model for other states' attorneys 
general. However, significant improvements can be made by both 
the legislature and the attorney general himself: (1) While the at-
torney general's office is properly structured for protection of the 
public interest,309 it is insufficiently funded.310 Both consumer pro-
tection activities311 and environmental protection activities812 are 
limited by inadequate resources. (2) While Michigan statutes pro-
vide a measure of protection for the consumer, 818 the lack of a com-
prehensive consumer protection bill severely hinders the attorney 
general's efforts.314 As the state legislature has been unwilling to pass 
such an act the attorney general's office should allocate the re-
sources necessary to secure passage of a comprehensive bill.816 The 
attorney general does have adequate substantive power to protect 
the environment.316 (3) The attorney general should establish a 
system under which the activities of the state's governmental units 
are centralized in the attorney general's office, but where the local 
units will still be able to act, in order to provide maximum protec-
tion for Michigan citizens.817 The office presently lacks a formal 
system for the receiving, recording, and reviewing of reports from 
local prosecutorial officers.318 (4) The attorney general is forced, be-
308. See note 305 supra. 
309. See text accompanying note 146 supra. 
310. See text accompanying notes 147-49 supra. 
311. See note 155 supra; text accompanying notes 183-86 supra. 
312. See note 199 supra. 
313. See text accompanying notes 42-88 supra. 
314. See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
315. See text accompanying notes 295-99 supra. 
316. See text accompanying notes 89-145 supra. 
317. See text accompanying notes 224-48 supra. 
318. See text accompanying notes 244-48 supra. 
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cause of inadequate resources, to rely on complaints and agency re-
ferrals. This reliance inhibits the attorney general's ability to recog-
nize or discover the more serious problems. 19 To remedy this prob-
lem, the attorney general should establish a monitoring system 20
and should allocate the resources necessary to establish field offices
in Detroit and other population centers.821 In addition, an intensive
public education program should be established.3 22 (5) In the area of
litigation, formal guidelines should be established to facilitate the
exercise of the attorney general's discretion.3 23 In addition, civil
actions should be favored over criminal actions.324 There is a serious
postlitigation problem in that the attorney general lacks sufficient
resources to operate a compliance check system.3 25 (6) The attorney
general should increase the use of his powers to formulate and in-
fluence state policy.3 28 His use of advisory opinions to influence the
policy of the state should be expanded,3 2 7 and care should be taken
to ensure that requests for opinions are expeditiously handled .
2
The attorney general should begin to use his power to review pro-
posed administrative regulations with regard to substantive policy.3 29
ie should begin cautiously to use his power to refuse to represent
agencies and boards, in order to influence state policy.330
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